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Conclusion ................................................................................................546
INTRODUCTION
Sanctuary policies are considered among the most contentious
feature of today’s immigration federalism debates, because they place
federal and local policies in seeming opposition to one another. As a
result, the term “sanctuary” is not only highly contested and nuanced
in the academic setting 1 and political arena, 2 but it has also become
increasingly obscured through competing narratives in the
immigration debate. On January 25, 2017, President Trump attacked
“sanctuary cities” by issuing an executive order that targeted

1. See generally Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance
and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539 (2017)

(connecting crimmigration’s critique as a defense strategy of sanctuary policies);
Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703
(2018) (unpacking sanctuary policies’ constitutional legitimacy and importance for
severing criminal law from immigration law enforcement) [hereinafter Lasch et al.,
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”]; Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and DogWhistle Politics, 42 NEW ENGLAND J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159 (2016)
(highlighting waves of sanctuary resistance and counter movements seeking to
defund sanctuary jurisdictions) [hereinafter Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle
Politics]; Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 435
(2018) (unpacking sanctuary policies’ constitutional legitimacy and connection to
local prerogatives); Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The New
Sanctuary and Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459 (2018)
(identifying differences between sanctuary and anti-sanctuary policies in relation to
federal immigration law, and highlighting their emergence in public and private
spaces); Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103
MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2019) (highlighting different public and private spaces where
sanctuary policies have emerged) [hereinafter Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary
Networks]; Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010) (connecting sanctuary policies to the notion of an
inclusive local citizenship); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary, 61 SMU L.
REV. 133 (2008) (exploring the discursive debates over the term sanctuary)
[hereinafter Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary].
2. See Josh Gerstein, Appeals Court Overturns Block on Texas Anti-Sanctuary
Law, POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2018), http://politi.co/2DpCrIF [https://perma.cc/M2LJFUGF] (highlighting how courts have legitimized both sanctuary and anti-sanctuary
policies); Adriana Gomez Licon, Sessions Blasts Sanctuary Cities, Calls Miami
DAILY
HERALD
(Aug.
16,
2017),
‘Good’
Example,
https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20170816/news/308169879
[https://perma.cc/NJ2A-8MJP] (highlighting different understandings of sanctuary
policies from a rule-of-law and federalism perspective); Jazmine Ulloa, How
California’s Trust Act Shaped the Debate on the New ‘Sanctuary State’ Proposal,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-trust-actsanctuary-state-immigration-20170910-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/E7UXVKN4] (discussing how public officials and law enforcement hold different views of
sanctuary policies).
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jurisdictions for “willfully violat[ing] Federal law in an attempt to
shield aliens from removal from the United States.” 3 At the core of
his anti-sanctuary order is the political narrative that “[sanctuary]
jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people
and to the very fabric of our Republic.” 4 When a federal judge in San
Francisco issued a nationwide injunction temporarily blocking the
executive order, President Trump’s administration responded:
“[sanctuary] cities are engaged in the dangerous and unlawful
nullification of Federal law in an attempt to erase our borders.” 5
Today, the term “sanctuary” in relation to sanctuary cities is
“generally associated with the unlawful facilitation of the continued
presence of unauthorized immigrants and their families in this
country” — a narrative crafted by anti-immigrant groups like the
The
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). 6
scholarly consensus, however, points to sanctuary policies’ many
benefits, rather than their harms. 7 Framing sanctuary policies as
constitutionally legitimate remains a challenge, in part because of the
category of “illegal alien” and the complex history of immigration
federalism. 8 President Trump’s political narratives and legal threats
to defund cities have been effective precisely because they situate
3. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02102/enhancing-publicsafety-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/N5XB-28HM].
4. Id.
5. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement on
Sanctuary Cities Ruling (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-sanctuary-cities-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/H72J-JCEL].
6. Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary, supra note 1, at 138.
7. See, e.g., Benjamin Gonzalez et al., The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities,
Crime, and Undocumented Immigration, 55 URB. AFF. REV. 3 (2017); Christopher J.
Lyons et al., Neighborhood Immigration, Violence, and City-Level Immigrant
Political Opportunities, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 604 (2013); Daniel E. Martínez et al.,

Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on ‘Sanctuary
Cities’ and Crime, 12 SOC. COMPASS 1 (2017); Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt & Daniel
E. Martínez, Sanctuary Policies and City-Level Incidents of Violence, 1990 to 2010,

JUST. Q. (2017); MARCEL ROMAN ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A MESS IN TEXAS:
THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF SB4 ON PUBLIC TRUST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
(forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE ECONOMY (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/theeffects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy/
[https://perma.cc/R27MRK3N] [hereinafter WONG, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES].
8. See generally ALLAN COLBERN & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, STATE
CITIZENSHIP: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming
2020); PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004).
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sanctuary policies as a resistance to federal law without guiding
State and local governments’ special interest in
principles. 9
protecting their residents and the constitutional rights of all persons,
regardless of their immigration status, are notably absent in the
narrative, when they should be front-and-center. Going beyond the
Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle, rights-based
guiding principles and state and local government interests
substantiate the legitimacy of sanctuary policies.
Shortly after President Trump took office and issued his antisanctuary executive order, Mayor Carlos Gimenez repealed MiamiDade’s 2013 county jail sanctuary policy. 10 This effectively allowed
all new detainer requests issued by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to be honored and for suspected undocumented
immigrants to be held longer than forty-eight hours, thereby violating
an individual’s due process rights. 11 As a result, 436 people in MiamiDade were turned over to ICE on detainer requests in 2017. 12 This
local repeal was a response to increased federal pressure. On August
4, 2017, acting Attorney General Alan Hanson sent Miami-Dade,
among other sanctuary jurisdictions, a memo “warning [that] they
must prove compliance with federal policies or lose crime-fighting

9. See Michael Kagan, What We Talk About When We Talk About Sanctuary
Cities, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 391, 391–408 (2018).
10. See Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Mayor Orders Jails to Comply with Trump
Crackdown on “Sanctuary” Counties, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 26, 2017),

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article128984759.html (last visited June 5, 2019); Press Release, Miami Dade
Cty., Statement from Mayor Carlos A. Gimenez Regarding Changes to Federal
Immigration Laws (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.miamidade.gov/releases/2017-01-31mayor-statement.asp [https://perma.cc/J6D9-XZWX].
11. Miami-Dade passed an anti-detainer policy on December 3, 2013, authorizing
the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department to honor detainer
requests from ICE “only if the federal government agrees in writing to reimburse
Miami-Dade County for any and all costs relating to compliance” and limited this to
inmates being held that had “a Forcible Felony, as defined in Florida Statute section
776.08” or a “pending charge of a non-bondable offense, as provided by Article I,
Section 14 of the Florida Constitution.” Res. No. R-1008-13 (Miami-Dade Cty., Fla.
2013); see Douglass Hanks, Miami-Dade Complied with Trump to Change Its
‘Sanctuary’ Status. It Worked, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article165837497.html [https://perma.cc/4K3S-D2AC].
12. Douglas Hanks, Sanctuary No More: Feds Seize 1 Immigration Detainee per
Day
from
Miami-Dade
Jails,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Jan.
3,
2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article192652294.html [https://perma.cc/5DLQ-W9HN].
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grant money.” 13 At the core of the letter was a carefully crafted
narrative linking sanctuary policies to increased crime, citing
progressive states like California and large cities like Chicago and
New York. Despite social science research showing that sanctuary
policies are successful 14 and that immigrants are less frequently
engaged in criminal activity 15 than citizens, when sanctuary policies
are conservatively defined as unprincipled resistance to federal law,
they become open to conflation with anti-immigrant frames and false
notions of immigrant criminality.
The federal government and its agencies have exclusive authority
to pass and enforce immigration laws, but federal capacity to enforce
its laws has always been limited. 16 As a result, the federal
government has formed partnerships with states and localities in
order to expand its own capacity to identify and apprehend

13. Douglas Hanks, Trump Administration Warns Miami-Dade over ‘Sanctuary’
MIAMI
HERALD
(Apr.
21,
2017),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article146091594.html [https://perma.cc/R5YQ-WG9G].
14. See supra note 7.
15. See generally Michael T. Light & Ty Miller, Does Undocumented
Immigration Increase Violent Crime?, 56 CRIMINOLOGY 370 (2018); Thomas J. Miles
& Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from
Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937 (2014); Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal

Compliance,

Immigrants in Texas: Illegal Immigrant Conviction and Arrest Rates for Homicide,
Sex Crimes, Larceny, and Other Crimes, CATO INST. (Feb. 26, 2018),

https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/criminalimmigrants-texas-illegal-immigrant [https://perma.cc/RVZ5-CT7Z].
16. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 20 (providing a table
of the major court cases establishing federal plenary power from 1875 to 1948).
Federal plenary power over immigration law first emerged in 1849, and then
continued to expand through the late 1800s and early 1900s. Smith v. Turner struck
down New York and Massachusetts’ state laws imposing an entry tax on alien
passengers arriving from foreign ports as preempted by federal exclusivity over
foreign commerce. 48 U.S. 283 (1849). Chy Lung v. Freeman struck down
California’s state law imposing an entry bond on Chinese immigrants, ruling that
control over the admission of foreigners into the country was exclusively a federal
responsibility. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). Chae Chan Ping v. United States declared that the
U.S. Constitution provided for federal immigration control, describing such control
as absolute, exclusive, and beyond judicial review. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The
distinction between federal immigration law and state/local alienage law began to
emerge during this time as well. Yick Wo v. Hopkins struck down a San Francisco
ordinance regulating laundry establishments in the city that discriminated against
Chinese immigrants for violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
clause. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Fong Yue Ting v. United States, by contrast, expanded
federal power by allowing federal deportation of Chinese immigrants, even long-term
residents. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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individuals for removal. 17 Referring to President Trump’s campaign
promise to deport two to three million immigrants, Anna Law
explains, “to find, apprehend, legally process, incarcerate and return
that many people to their home countries would require the
cooperation of local law enforcement.” 18 This is why the executive
order not only targets sanctuary policies, but also makes interior
enforcement partnerships a top priority and reinstitutes the Secure
Communities (“S-Comm”) program. 19 State and local governments
that refuse to cooperate present a major obstacle to Trump’s antiimmigrant agenda.
Sanctuary policies form resistance to federal law that are built on
deep constitutional grounds. This Article contributes to the literature
on sanctuary by proposing a new framework for organizing and
characterizing the motivations behind, and goals of, sanctuary policies
over time. Part I explores and considers how four current approaches
to understanding sanctuary — typological-legal, historical-legal,
historical-moral and policy-data — are employed in areas of
scholarship that are currently unbridged. We argue that each of these

17. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP), created in the 1980s and continuing to be
enforced today, makes identifying, arresting, and deporting noncitizens encountered
in federal, state, and local prisons and jails a priority. See Lasch et al., Understanding
“Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1724. The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act passed in 1996 created Section 287(g) (of the
Immigration and Nationality Act), granting the Department of Homeland Security
the ability to enter into agreements with local law enforcement agencies to deputize
local officers to engage in immigration enforcement. See Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 287(g), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)); see also Lasch et al., Understanding
“Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1725–27. The biggest shift occurred from 2008 to
2014, with the creation of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program, which
automatically shares the biometric fingerprint data of every person booked into a
local jail with the Department of Homeland Security. This enables ICE to issue
detainer requests to local jails for immigrants identified by federal databases for
residing in the country unlawfully. See Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance,
92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 154 (2013); Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the
Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers Immigration Law, 35 WILLIAM
MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173 (2008).
18. Anna O. Law, States Resisting Trump Deportation Plans Can Look to the
Antebellum South, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/statesresisting-trump-deportation-antebellum-south-540727
[https://perma.cc/2DMU4Y9Y].
19. S-Comm was temporarily suspended by DHS policy under President Obama
from November 20, 2014 through January 25, 2017, and was reauthorized under
President Trump’s executive order. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/201702102/enhancing-public-safety-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/N5XB-28HM].
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approaches have led to similar arguments in defense of sanctuary, as a
constitutionally legitimate function of state and local governance.
Part II proposes a new framework for organizing and analyzing the
motivations behind, and goals of, sanctuary policies over three
distinctive periods of development between 1979 and 2018. Part III
explains why this Article’s framework is able to ground a synthesis of
the four separate approaches to show that sanctuary is much more
than a resistance movement. Our framework adds greater precision
to understanding how social movements have evolved and restructured sanctuary policies to better resist the federal government
and uphold constitutional rights. It also focuses on how immigrant
rights are being shaped by actors who engage in state and local policymaking with constitutional constraints in mind.
This Article argues that the narrative of sanctuary policies as
violating federal law and challenging core American values, ignores
their critical place in American history. Since their origin in the
1980s, sanctuary policies became less connected to the specific
struggles of Central American refugees and assumed broader goals
related to civil rights and immigrant rights that span the basic
functions of state and local governance. Sanctuary today provides a
moral and constitutionally legitimate form of integration and
protection with regard to undocumented residents.
I. APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING SANCTUARY
This Part briefly identifies and reviews four approaches that have
been employed to understand sanctuary policies: typological-legal,
historical-legal, historical-moral and policy-data. The first approach
focuses almost exclusively on unpacking the constitutional
underpinnings and specific functions of sanctuary policies. The
second approach, by contrast, focuses on broader constitutional
dynamics that shape federal preemption and state and local policymaking in relation to immigration law. The third and fourth
approaches shift the focus away from the U.S. Constitution and
towards a political understanding of how social movements shape
sanctuary and how sanctuary policies, once they are passed, are
linked to crime and economic outcomes.
Each of the four approaches provides a unique understanding of
sanctuary, but scholars have yet to bridge the gap and see the
connection between these approaches. This gap has prevented the
development of a comprehensive understanding, forged from joining
constitutional analysis, social movement analysis, and policy analysis
in the context of federalism. While the four approaches have
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emerged separately from one another, they are connected through
their shared understanding of sanctuary policies as substantively
justified local prerogatives grounded in constitutional principles,
moral values, and good policy. This Article posits that a more holistic
understanding of sanctuary policies emerges where the four
approaches complement one another. By analyzing policy trends
over time, this Article integrates key features from all four
approaches to explain the motivations behind, and goals of, sanctuary
policies.
A. Typological-Legal Approach
Grounding sanctuary policies in a set of guiding constitutional
principles, the typological-legal approach provides an important
corrective to the framing of sanctuary policies as unlawful. 20
Christopher Lasch’s typology shows how sanctuary policies, rather
than breaking the rule-of-law, serve as critical constitutional
instruments often used to sever the connection between criminal law
and immigration law. 21 Referred to by scholars as “crimmigration,”
the intersection between criminal law mechanisms (such as the use of
local law enforcement and detention) and federal immigration law
enforcement problematically casts a wider interior enforcement net
for immigration violations that are civil and not criminal. Immigrants
in deportation proceedings as a result of crimmigration lack due
process and procedural protections, making Lasch’s typology of
sanctuary policies both about protecting the rights of all persons and
creating resistance to immigration enforcement mechanisms that use
state or local governing resources. 22 The typology unpacks five areas

20. See, e.g., supra note 1.
21. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1.
22. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 379 (2006). According to Juliet Stumpf,
“[c]riminal law seeks to prevent and address harm to individuals and society from
violence or fraud or evil motive,” whereas “[i]mmigration law determines who may
cross the border and reside here, and who must leave.” See generally Felicia Arriaga,

Understanding Crimmigration: Implications for Racial and Ethnic Minorities Within
the United States, 10 SOC. COMPASS, 805 (2016); Jennifer M. Chacon, Managing
Migration through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 805–06 (2009)

(explaining “crimmigration” and its historical development and why it is important);
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV.
1457 (2013) (analyzing the development of crimmigration law); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007) (examining the
convergence of criminal justice and immigration control); Hiroshi Motomura, The

Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests,
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in local law enforcement agencies’ formal and informal rules that
create local sanctuary:
(1) barring investigation of civil and criminal immigration violations
by local law enforcement, (2) limiting compliance with immigration
detainers and immigration warrants, (3) refusing U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) access to local jails, (4) limiting
local law enforcement’s disclosure of sensitive information, and (5)
precluding local participation in joint operations with federal
immigration enforcement. 23

Localities enacting these five types of policies generally seek to
“preserve local sovereignty, define local priorities, and enhance
community trust in law enforcement.” 24 These local prerogatives in
policing and community trust are deeply rooted in constitutional
rights, including Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which protects
individuals from illegal searches and stops and from arrests without
probable cause. 25
Addressing the constitutional substance of local prerogatives
through a typology approach offers a critical counter-narrative to
anti-immigrant positions, which rely on framing sanctuary policies as
local resistance to federal law that demeans the rule-of-law. 26 Lasch’s
and the Civil-Criminal Line, 32 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 167 (2011) (examining
how immigration federalism is affected by the relationship between criminal law and
immigration law).
23. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1707.
24. Id. at 1709.
25. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying the Fourth
Amendment protection of arrests without probable cause); Miranda-Olivares v.
Clackamas County, No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014)
(applying the Fourth Amendment protection of arrests without probable cause); see
infra Section I.C. See generally Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration
Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2013)
[hereinafter Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona].
26. When signing Texas’s anti-sanctuary state law (S.B. 4) in 2017, Texas
Governor Gregg Abbot argued that pro-sanctuary policies demeaned the rule-of-law,
led to higher rates of crime (without evidence), and referred to the case of Kate
Steinle, who was shot and killed by an undocumented immigrant in San Francisco,
California (a sanctuary city). Patrick Svitek, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Signs
‘Sanctuary Cities’ Bill into Law, TEX. TRIB. (May 7, 2017, 8:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/07/abbott-signs-sanctuary-cities-bill/
[https://perma.cc/7BT2-FJE5]. Immediately after the tragic death of Steinle, the
Republican-controlled House passed the “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act”
(H.R. 3009), which would have denied federal funding to cities that refuse to report
detained immigrants, also known as “sanctuary cities.” H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. (1st
Sess.
2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3009
[https://perma.cc/NW7F-TTWS]. See generally Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and DogWhistle Politics, supra note 1 (highlighting multiple legislative attempts in Congress
to defund sanctuary jurisdictions).
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typology reveals how sanctuary is a legitimate policy means of
upholding the U.S. Constitution. Importantly, the constitutional
roots anchoring sanctuary policies are not exclusive to Tenth
Annie Lai and
Amendment anti-commandeering concerns. 27
Christopher Lasch make this point very clear, explaining that
President Trump’s executive order and federal funding of local law
enforcement raise much deeper constitutional concerns over the use
of criminal law to enforce immigration law. 28 They explain, “contact
with criminal justice system actors serves as an entry point to a jail-todeportation pipeline” that has led state and local governments to
passing some form of sanctuary policy in order “to protect the civil
and constitutional rights of [their] residents.” 29
A key feature of sanctuary policies is how they symbolically and
legally insulate a group of people from the enforcement of federal
law. A report by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center identifies
seven different county-level policies that limit local assistance by
sheriffs and jails who often engage directly with ICE on immigration
enforcement. 30 Additionally, crimmigration analysis of sanctuary
policies provides an important alternative frame that can help unlink
immigrants with criminality. 31 Even more powerful, the report’s
analysis highlights constitutional intersections that provide direction
for considering sanctuary policies beyond Tenth Amendment
tensions between federal and local policymaking. 32 The policies are
also substantively grounded in the Fourth, 33 Fifth, 34 and Fourteenth 35

27. See Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona, supra note 25, at 698–700;
Motomura, supra note 1, at 446–47; Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”,
supra note 1, at 1747–57.
28. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 557–83.
29. See id. at 545.
30. See generally LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL
RESOURCE CTR., SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S
COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH DEPORTATIONS (Dec. 2016),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final_1-min.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PBK-Q2BC].
31. See supra note 22.
32. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 542, 573–75.
33. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 449 (explaining that “the Fourth Amendment
prohibits searches and seizures without a judicial warrant or probable cause to
believe that a crime has occurred” and noting that “complying with an ICE request to
extend detention would typically violate the U.S. Constitution”). See Lasch et al.,
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” supra note 1, 1732–33 (referencing court decisions
and officials that suggest how local detentions based on detainer requests might
violate Fourth Amendment due process rights).
34. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 446, n.36 (explaining that a “federal district
court found that section 9(a) of the [Anti-Sanctuary Presidential] Executive Order
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Amendments as fundamental protections for citizens and non-citizens
alike. 36 Sanctuary protections are not only for undocumented
immigrants, but also for people of color and transgender individuals,
which are all groups that have historically been subject to punitive
policies, over policed, and excluded from having adequate federal
protections. 37
Historical precedent confirms this trend. For example, sanctuary
was provided to runaway slaves by a Massachusetts law from the
1850s, which forbade state and local officials from enforcing the
federal fugitive slave law, making the removal of any black person
from the state without court approval a crime and granting all blacks
equal due process protections under state law. 38 Civil rights have
been subsequently employed in other contexts to frame sanctuary
policies: When San Francisco, New York, and Chicago passed revised
versions of their sanctuary ordinances in 1989, advocates began to
assert that City of Refuge ordinances were part of a civil rights
policy. 39 Advocates brought city sanctuary policies in line with the
principle “that all persons residing within the city and county have

violates the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process requirement and is void for
vagueness”).
35. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1764–65
(referencing how states and cities have modelled their anti-discrimination laws after
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause).
36. See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 98–110; Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 390 (2006) (noting that criminal process rights are embodied in the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments, while immigration proceedings are generally governed by
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
37. Allan Colbern’s book manuscript traces the development of state and local
sanctuary policies through American history, including those protecting: runaway
slaves (1780–1860) from federal fugitive slave law, and Central American asylum
seekers (1980–1997) and undocumented immigrants (2000–2018) from federal
See generally Allan Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves:
immigration law.
Unauthorized Immigrants in a Federalist Framework (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) [hereinafter, Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves]; see also Allan
Colbern, The House Is Picking a Fight with ‘Sanctuary City’ Ordinances. How Is This
Like the Fugitive Slave Laws?, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/13/the-house-ispicking-a-fight-with-sanctuary-city-ordinances-how-is-this-like-the-fugitive-slavelaws/ [https://perma.cc/6PAL-6L97].
38. An Act to Protect the Rights and Liberties of the People of the
Commonwealth
of
Massachusetts,
Chap.
0498,
(Mass.
1855),
https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/97312/1855acts0489.txt?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/PT8W-DHME].
39. Jennifer Ridgley, The Birth of a Sanctuary-City: A History of Governmental
Sanctuary in San Francisco, in SANCTUARY PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 225 (2012).
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fundamental human, civil and constitutional rights.” 40 Similarly, as
recently as 2017, Santa Rosa’s sanctuary policy specifies “people of
color, Muslims, LGBTQ people and people with disabilities”
alongside immigrant residents. 41 Sanctuary under this policy goes
beyond resistance to federal immigration law and “calls upon all City
residents and all City Departments and employees to speak out
against acts of bullying, discrimination and hate violence and to stand
up for those who are targeted for such acts.” 42
Hiroshi Motomura developed a typology that goes beyond local
law enforcement to draw out two basic features of sanctuary policies:
resistance to enforcement and integration of protected groups.43
Rather than focusing exclusively on sanctuary policies, Motomura
unpacks five categories in which sanctuary policies have been
grounded within broader policy dynamics of immigration federalism:
(1) structural limits on federal authority; (2) state and local
prerogatives; (3) substantive limits on arrests and detention; (4)
fairness, equity, and proportionality; and (5) transparency and nondiscrimination.
The first three categories unpack the legal
foundations of sanctuary policies in American federalism. The
federal, state, and local governments are all bound — to varying
extents — by the Constitution. The interplay between the three is
delineated by constitutional prescriptions.
For example, as
Motomura explains, structural limits are placed on federal authority
by the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine and by the
Spending Clause, both of which insulate states from federal
mandates. 44 Beyond structural limits found in federalism, separation
of powers makes congressional legislation — not presidential
executive orders — the appropriate vehicle for allowing federal grants
to be conditioned on state or local government compliance with
particular mandates. 45
40. See id. (emphasis added).
41. See Res. 2017-017 (Santa Rosa City Council, Cal. 2017).
42. See id.
43. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 437–40.
44. See id. at 446. Motomura explains that, under the Tenth Amenment’s anticommandeering clause, the “federal government may not directly compel a state to
enact a regulation or enforce a federal regulatory program, conscript state officers for
that purpose, or prohibit a state from enacting laws.” Id. Similarly, the Spending
Clause, Motomura explains, limits the federal government from using “its control
over the authorization and disbursement of funds to “coerce” states in their decisionmaking.” Id.
45. See id. at 446 n.36 (providing a brief description of court cases that have
uniformly held that the federal executive branch may not withhold federal funding to
localities because the conditions were not authorized by federal legislation).
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Whereas the first category in Motomura’s typology insulates states
and localities from federal enforcement, the second and third
categories move away from the focus on federal-state relations and
instead highlight the state-specific origins of sanctuary policies.46
Beyond the Tenth Amendment, local prerogatives in the form of
community policing or integration policies, and local concerns over
the substantive limits on arrests and detentions raised by Fourth
Amendment rights, are both legal foundations upon which sanctuary
policies emerge. 47 Meanwhile, state and local prerogatives point
towards how state and local governments perform their basic
governing responsibilities. 48
In direct contrast to the resistance-only understanding,
Motomura’s fourth category establishes a progressive federalism49
understanding of sanctuary policies as a state or local cushion to the
harsh federal immigration system. 50 This parallels the crimmigration
approach, 51 but with a different point of emphasis on how the
national and local are connected. 52 It also directly contrasts Kris
Kobach’s “attrition through enforcement” approach to federalism,
which encourages state and local governments to further restrict
immigrant access and rights in order to make life conditions so harsh
that immigrants opt to self-deport. 53 Sanctuary policies increase local
discretion in ways that can ease the harshness of the immigration
system as a whole, not only by preventing state or local authorities
46. See id. at 445–48.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. The term “progressive federalism” refers to the interconnection between
local, state, and national government and policy that propels the national direction on
rights and equality. See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 12–16
(advancing the argument that progressive federalism, located in state or local level
policies that advance equality and justice, can move the entire country forward in
advancing the rights of immigrants and other marginalized populations); Heather K.
Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY J. (Spring 2012),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/
[https://perma.cc/B445-5NMS]; see generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the
New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014) (arguing that federalism
is a tool for progress in national politics, national power, national policymaking, and
national norms, where progressive state and local policies can go beyond policy
diffusion from the bottom up, to also include pushing the nation forward by
overcoming political gridlock, cultivating discourse and agenda setting, and diffusing
policy up that leads to larger progress in national political development).
50. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 460–61.
51. See supra note 22.
52. See supra note 50.
53. See generally Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational
Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155 (2007).
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and resources from enforcing federal immigration law, but also by
facilitating immigrant access to local resources and participation in
local institutions. Motomura’s last category of non-discrimination
adds that sanctuary policies have taken on an important
contemporary role in preserving America’s core values in the rule of
law. Contemporary U.S. immigration law has replaced the past
tradition of providing expansive rights to immigrants, who were once
considered to be “Americans-in-waiting,” with a harsh system of
interior enforcement that infringes on constitutional rights. 54
Some scholars have taken the typological-legal approach one step
further: They have begun to consider how sanctuary policies might
cumulate into more robust forms of protection. Rose Cruison
Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram developed the concept of a
“sanctuary network” to capture how state and local jurisdictions —
like city governments, county courts, and universities — can enact
sanctuary policies that, together, form robust networks of legal
protections to insulate immigrants from federal enforcement of
immigration law. 55 This emergence of sanctuary networks across
multiple levels of government and institutional spaces, and their
capacity to insulate undocumented immigrants in more robust ways
when paired together, adds new depth to their substantive
foundation. Many of the innovations in sanctuary’s location are
emerging entirely outside of formal policy-making, including in both
courts and schools.
B. Historical-Legal Approach
The historical-legal approach focuses on how federal preemption
over immigration law shapes the role played by states and localities in
regulating the lives of immigrants. This is distinctive from the
typological approach because it centers the analysis on federal
preemption, rather than unpacking constitutional sources of tensions
in federalism. At the same time, the two approaches provide
complementary conceptions of state and local government’s role in
immigrant integration. The typological approach provides a precise
understanding of how sanctuary policies function to integrate
immigrants, whereas the historical-legal provides broader

54. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 451–55 (building on his prior work); see also
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014).
55. See generally Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 1.
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constitutional understanding of why state and local governance ought
to be oriented around integration rather than restriction.
Since the late 1800s, the federal government has gained plenary
powers over U.S. immigration law, and scholars have examined state
and local power to pass polices related to immigration and
Alex
immigrants within the context of federal exclusivity. 56
Aleinikoff analyzes how the U.S Constitution sets up different
national and local governing relations, with a focus on who can and
cannot exclude immigrants. 57 The plenary powers doctrine sets up
exclusive federal control over immigration law, which Aleinikoff
argues empowers only the federal government to restrict or exclude
immigrants’ right to enter or stay in the country. 58 Lacking this
power, state and local governments, by contrast, are guided by a
personhood framework that obligates them to providing immigrant
residents similar rights to citizens. 59 Scholars refer to “personhood”
with the idea that all individuals possess basic human rights,
regardless of how federal, state, or local governments shape these
rights. 60 Under the plenary power doctrine, federal immigration law
is exempt from many of the obligations that personhood rights
require, especially on questions of admission, exclusion, deportation,
and naturalization. 61 By contrast, states and localities are required to
fully recognize personhood rights. 62

56. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8 (providing a brief
history of this transition to federal exclusivity in immigration law that emerges from
the 1870s to the 2000s).
57. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1990) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens,
Membership and the Constitution]; see generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP (2002).
58. Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, supra note 57,
at 10–11.
59. Id. at 20–27.
60. LINDSEY N. KINGSTON, FULLY HUMAN: PERSONHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, AND
RIGHTS 3 (2019) (referring to the United Nation’s 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), which asserts that “recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” lays the foundations for
modern rights based on the concept of personhood).
61. See Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, supra note
57, at 10–11 (arguing that “Congress acts essentially free from any constitutional
limits when it defines the categories of aliens entitles to enter, designates categories
of excludable aliens, establishes admissions and detention procedures at the border,
mandates the deportation of aliens residing in the country, denies resident aliens
benefits and federal employment, permits the interdiction on the high seas of aliens
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Unlike the legal typologies developed by Lasch 63 and Motomura64
that address the deep federalism conflict raised by sanctuary policies,
Aleinikoff’s reliance on plenary powers obscures these conflicts
between levels of government rooted in the U.S. Constitution. 65 The
personhood framework is also problematic, especially with regard to
sanctuary policies, because it draws from natural rights of all persons
rather than specific constitutional language and protections. As a
result, Aleinikoff reveals tensions between plenary powers and
personhood rights that miss the federalism conflict central to
sanctuary policies.
By contrast, Hiroshi Motomura and Linda Bosniak explore
immigrant integration policy within a citizenship framework for
understanding rights. 66 This provides a different analytical lens for
considering restrictive policies limited to the federal government
under the plenary powers doctrine, with state and local governments
obligated to uphold the constitutional rights of citizens and noncitizens alike. Highlighting the rationale applied in Plyler v. Doe,
which invalidated the Texas statute allowing K-12 public schools to
deny undocumented immigrant schoolchildren access or charge them
tuition, Motomura shows the ways in which Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection has been extended to undocumented immigrants. 67
Thus, constitutional safeguards serve to legitimate integration and
sanctuary policies, while simultaneously establishing limits on what

seeking to come to the United States, and defines classes of aliens ineligible for U.S.
citizenship”).
62. Id. at 19 (referring to “a notion of fundamental human rights that protects
individuals regardless of their status” outside of the federal immigration law context).
63. See Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1.
64. See Motomura, supra note 1.
65. See Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, supra note
57.
66. See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); MOTOMURA, supra note 54; Linda Bosniak,
Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 1 (2008);
Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1285 (2002); Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of
Alienage, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 373 (2000); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized,
7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000); Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants,
Preemption and Equality, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 179 (1994); Hiroshi Motomura, The

Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1995).
67. See MOTOMURA, supra note 54; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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states and localities can do to discriminate against and restrict
immigrants’ rights and access public resources. 68
Linda Bosniak takes the logic of constitutional safeguards even
further, arguing that no distinction should be made between citizens
and non-citizens under state and local policy. 69 The defining question
here is “whether government treatment of aliens beyond the border
broadly construed — beyond questions of admission, exclusion,
deportation, and naturalization — is itself to be viewed as an incident
or extension of the immigration power.” 70 While Bosniak does not
specifically address sanctuary policies, her broader treatment of state
and local immigrant policy aligns with both the crimmigration analysis
of Lai and Lasch and the sanctuary typology developed by
Motomura. 71 Immigration law, applied to the external border and in
an outward-facing manner, should not overlap with state or local
policies regulating the lives of residents.
Once undocumented immigrants are residing in the country,
federal immigration law is no longer exclusive, and it overlaps with
state and local laws. The Second Circuit, in City of New York v.
United States, clarified the limits of sanctuary policies as a form of
resistance to federal enforcement of immigration law. 72 It held that
states and localities could not directly prevent communication of
information previously obtained about legal status to federal
immigration officers, but it also preserved state and local power to
not inquire about immigrant’s legal status (“don’t ask”) under the
Tenth Amendment. 73 Recent challenges to the constitutionality of
sanctuary policies under President Trump are reviewed in the
Conclusion of this Article. Today, City of New York v. United States
remains the only limit on sanctuary resistance; states and localities
cannot actively obstruct federal enforcement, but they can sever their
connection from immigration enforcement entirely. 74
Beyond questions about the separation of power, the enforcement
of federal immigration law by state and local jurisdictions produces

68. See MOTOMURA, supra note 54; see also GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN,
supra note 8.
69. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1058 (1994).
70. Id. at 1094.
71. See generally Lai & Lasch, supra note 1; Motomura, supra note 1, at 437–40;
see also Section I.A.
72. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
73. See id.
74. See id.
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constitutional violations against a range of rights of citizens and
noncitizens. 75 In Galarza v. Lehigh County, the Third Circuit held
that states and localities are not required to imprison people based on
ICE detainers. 76 Since Lehigh County, Pennsylvania was free to
disregard the ICE detainer, the ACLU interpreted the decision as
suggesting that states and localities “shares in the responsibility for
violating Galarza’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights.”77
Following the case, the Lehigh County Board of Commissions ended
its policy of imprisoning people on ICE detainers. 78 In MirandaOlivares v. Clackamas County, the U.S. District Court of Oregon
added that honoring ICE detainers without probable cause is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 79
Legal scholarship on immigration law, together with recent
typology work on sanctuary policies, provides broader context to the
constitutional questions raised when states and localities regulate
undocumented immigrants. The personhood framework is often
disconnected from the federalism conflicts under the Constitution,
because it envisions rights as being universal rather than bound to a
specific level of government. Section I.C. and Section II of this
Article explore how church-based sanctuary declarations and refuge
are rooted in moral (similar to personhood), rather than
constitutional, foundations. Unlike state and local government
sanctuary policies, church-based sanctuary declarations are liable for
violating federal immigration law and sanctuary workers have been
prosecuted under Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) for “bringing in and harboring of aliens.” 80 The moral origins
of sanctuary policies by non-state actors still play a critical role, as
churches become actors in spurring underground movements to avoid

75. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 543.
76. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 639–45 (3d Cir. 2014).
77. Galarza v. Szalczyk, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/immigrantsrights/galarza-v-szalczyk [https://perma.cc/FN2N-MA44]. See Galarza, 745 F.3d at
644–45. See also Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 547 (referencing the federal court
decisions as “suggesting that jurisdictions that elected to hold people could be liable
for violating their Fourth Amendment rights”).
78. See Res. 2014-36, 2014 (Lehigh Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, Pa. 2014); see also
Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 61 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
79. See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at *7–9 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (ruling that Clackamas county violated the
Fourth Amendment by solely relying on the ICE detainer request to hold a
noncitizen for two weeks).
80. See Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 1, at 1230. See
infra Section II.A.2. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (2018).
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federal prosecution, in expressing civil disobedience against federal
policy, and in partnering with government officials to reform national,
state, and local policies. 81
The typological- and historical-legal approaches reviewed in
Sections I.A. and I.B. offer important clarity to the constitutional
substance that legitimatize sanctuary policies. This goes well beyond
the Tenth Amendment’s separation of federal and state powers.
States and localities are bound to uphold the Constitution’s provision
of rights to citizens and non-citizens. As a result, progressive states
and localities can employ sanctuary policies as a mechanism for
easing the harshness of the immigration system, sever the connection
between criminal law and immigration law, 82 and provide a more
robust policy network to integrate immigrant residents, regardless of
their legal status under federal law. Grassroots activism adds moral
depth to the constitutional safeguards of progressive policymaking,
which together provide a powerful counter to the “resistance only”
narrative. Rather than focusing on the tensions between federal and
state policy, they ground analysis of sanctuary policies in
constitutional legitimacy and local prerogatives responding to specific
demands within affected communities.
C. Historical-Moral Approach
The moral origins of sanctuary offer a powerful frame for
contemporary debates around the protection of persecuted groups.
Biblical, English common law, Greek, Roman, and Anglo-Saxon
traditions all share in common the role of churches in providing a
place of refuge to persons who were convicted of crimes and lacked
legal protections for their defense under formal government
policies. 83 In the United States, public and private entities gave
sanctuary to runaway slaves, Jews escaping the Holocaust, civil rights
workers fleeing mob violence in the South, draft resisters during the

81. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 25 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (examining how churches in antebellum, Jim Crow,
and contemporary America played a role in shaping activism in state and local
government sanctuary movements).
82. See supra note 22 (reviewing crimmigration literature).
83. See Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the
Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899 (1995); Jorge L. Carro,

Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or Dangerous Misinterpretation of
an Abandoned Ancient Privilege, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (1986); Douglas L. Colbert,
The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury: A Government’s Weapon against the
Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 38–48 (1986); Villazor, What Is a
Sanctuary, supra note 1, at 138–39.
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Vietnam War, Central American asylum seekers, and contemporary
undocumented immigrants. 84
Despite this overlap between private and public spheres,
scholarship on church movements remains largely disconnected from
the constitutional analysis found in the first (typological-legal) and
second approaches (historical-legal), and disconnected from the
empirical analysis found in the fourth approach (policy-data). 85 The
focus of the historical-moral approach has been on moral claims
rooted to human rights critiques of national sovereignty. For
example, Lane Van Ham connects churches to immigration activism,
beginning with biblical calls for hospitality at the end of World War II
to pressure the United States to admit displaced persons from
Europe. 86 Advancing a theory of political discourse rooted in the
moral “appreciation of global poverty as an oppressive force that
challenges assumptions about the regulation of national boundaries,”
Ham’s analytical approach focuses on challenging national
sovereignty on moral grounds. 87 Much like the limits of Aleinikoff’s
personhood framework, Ham’s analysis of the church movement is
disconnected from constitutional and federalism concerns salient to
the current sanctuary debate.
The larger trend in the scholarship examining the 1980s Central
American crisis connects social movements led by churches to
national, rather than local, policy, with a focus on moral claims to
refuge. 88 Part II of this Article reveals how the church movement of

84. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 25 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary, supra note 1, at 138–
39; see generally ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN
CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN COLLISION (1st ed. 1988) (recounting the story of the
Arizona sanctuary workers).
85. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 84, at 92–111; HILARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND
CAESAR AT THE RIO GRANDE: SANCTUARY AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 84–202
(1995); RENNY GOLDEN & MICHAEL MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE NEW
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 63–94 (2d ed. 1986); see, e.g., GARY MACEOIN,
SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE STRUGGLE (Gary MacEoin ed., 1st ed. 1985);
ROBERT TOMSHO, THE AMERICAN SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 93–111 (1987).
86. See Lane Van Ham, Sanctuary Revisited: Central American Refugee
Assistance in the History of Church-Based Immigrant Advocacy, 10 POL. THEOLOGY
621, 621–22 (2009).
87. See id. at 637.
88. See, e.g., MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN
MIGRATION TO MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA (1st ed. 2006); SUSAN
BIBLER COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS’ STRUGGLE FOR
U.S. RESIDENCY 136–62 (2003).
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the 1980s went beyond a moral appeal for national change by leading
in policy activism at the national, state, and local levels.
D. Policy-Data Approach
Unlike the typological- and historical-legal approaches, the policydata approach turns away from constitutional analysis and instead,
tracks and explains the proposal, passage and failure of sanctuary
policies. This method aligns more with the historical-moral approach,
where analytical focus is placed on actors and organizations important
to explaining the developing sanctuary movement. While often
disconnected from constitutional analysis, the policy-data approach
offers a distinctive contribution to the shared understanding of
sanctuary policies as substantively justified local prerogatives. It
provides a systematic way of identifying the causal effects of
sanctuary policies on outcomes like crime. 89 Thus far, one of the
primary empirical contributions from policy-data approaches has
been to show that sanctuary policies are indeed good for improving
local trust with immigrant communities and achieving lower crime
rates. 90
Benjamin Gonzalez, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen El-Khatib
find no statistical difference in violent crime, rape, or property crime
across sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities. 91 Using a dataset compiled
by the National Immigration Law Clinic, which contained fifty-four
local jurisdictions’ sanctuary policies between 2002 and 2008, 92 they

89. Scholars have also examined policy datasets to test theories of political
behavior that offer an indirect (not direct) contribution to understanding sanctuary
policies. The focus of those studies is to understand race relations and how various
racial groups respond to immigrant threat, with sanctuary policies providing a proxy
for threat. See Jason P. Casellas & Sophia Jordán Wallace, Sanctuary Cities: Public

Attitudes Toward Enforcement Collaboration Between Local Police and Federal
Immigration Authorities, URB. AFF. REV., May 2018, at 1; Loren Collingwood &
Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Public Opposition to Sanctuary Cities in Texas:
Criminal Threat or Immigration Threat?, SOC. SCI. Q. (forthcoming); Kassra A. R.
Oskooii et al., Partisan Attitudes Toward Sanctuary Cities: The Asymmetrical Effects
of Political Knowledge, 46 POL. & POL’Y 951 (2018).
90. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 7, at 9; Lyons et al., supra note 7, at 604;
WONG, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 7, at 1.
91. They define sanctuary as a “city or police department that has passed a
resolution or ordinance expressly forbidding city or law enforcement officials from
inquiring into immigration status and/or cooperation with ICE.” See Gonzalez et al.,
supra note 7, at 4.
92. See NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED
ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND
LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
(2008),
http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILCLocalLawsResolutionsAndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf
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compared criminal activity between sanctuary and non-sanctuary
jurisdictions, and found no statistical difference. 93 Rather than
tracking enacted policies and employing a matching strategy to
compare sanctuary to non-sanctuary jurisdictions, as that study did,
Tom Wong used data collected by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) that provides a total count per county jurisdiction
of local compliance with ICE detainer requests. 94 That data allowed
Wong to examine sanctuary policies’ effects by comparing counties
that do not assist federal immigration enforcement officials from
counties that comply with immigration detainer requests. 95 Not only
do sanctuary counties have lower crime rates, but they also have
stronger economies than similarly situated pro-enforcement
counties. 96
Policy-data is also used to construct datasets that combine pro- and
anti-immigrant policies at the state and local level to measure the
overall orientation of a state or locality towards undocumented
immigrants. Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van developed the
Immigrant Climate Index, which provides this type of general
measure and combines sanctuary policies with other integrationist
policies in order to identify broader shifts in a jurisdiction’s protective

[https://perma.cc/93XX-LMGJ] [hereinafter LAWS, RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES].
For a discussion of how two categorically distinctive sanctuary policies emerge
between 2001 and 2005 yet are often problematically conflated together into a single
dataset, see also infra Section II. As we point out, this problem occurs with the
National Immigration Law Clinic dataset, which is the primary dataset used by
scholars examining sanctuary policies.
93. The fifty-four local jurisdictions in their dataset span twenty-one states, with a
majority falling under states with pro-immigrant policies (thirteen of the policies are
in California, and six of the policies are in Massachusetts). To test their claims about
criminal activity, they collect city-level data from the U.S. Census, including
population size, age, gender, education, income, ethnicity, and citizenship status, that
might influence criminal activity or the selection decision by a city to become a
sanctuary city. They then “genetically match” sanctuary policies in the same states to
control for these variables and statistically test the differences between sanctuary and
non-sanctuary jurisdictions on the matching variables, showing that there are no
differences between the two. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 7, at 29.
94. Wong defines sanctuary counties “as counties that do not assist federal
immigration enforcement officials by holding people beyond their release date on the
basis of immigration detainers” and non-sanctuary counties as “those that comply
with immigration detainer requests” based on this proxy. The ICE dataset codes
2,492 counties, 608 of which are defined by ICE as sanctuary jurisdictions according
to their “Current Detainer/Notification Acceptance Status,” which Wong explains
captures “92.2 percent of the total U.S. population and 95.3 percent of the total
foreign-born population in the United States.” See WONG, THE EFFECTS OF
SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 7, at 4.
95. See id. at 1.
96. See id.
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inclusion or punitive exclusion of undocumented immigrants. 97 This
use of policy-data parallels the network typology developed by
Villazor and Gulasekaram, 98 but provides an even broader snapshot
of the orientation each state and locality have towards undocumented
immigrants by including all integration and sanctuary policies
together. 99
Unlike the empirical works by Wong, and Gonzales, Collingwood,
and El-Khatib, which focus on a causal relationship between
sanctuary policy and crime, research designed to explain policy
development can theorize causal mechanisms that disconnect
sanctuary policies from their deeper constitutional foundations. This
happens when the mechanism mirrors the resistance only narrative.
For example, Pham and Van argue that a “Trump Effect” explains
the dramatic rise in protective states and local policies. 100 However,
arguing that the dramatic policy expansions made in 2017 were
primarily driven by resistance to President Trump disconnects
sanctuary policies from longer developments occurring in immigrant
rights at the state and local levels, and places Tenth Amendment
concerns front-and-center over the other constitutional concerns
directly related to immigrant rights. This disconnection from
immigrant rights results in a hollow understanding of sanctuary
policies. Policy development explanations, like the legal typologies
developed by Motomura, 101 and Lasch, Chan, Eagly, Haynes, Lai,
McCormick, and Stumpf, 102 are more effective as a counter to the
resistance only critique when they are historically and constitutionally
grounded.
II. SANCTUARY POLICY DEVELOPMENT
This Part develops a periodization scheme to make sense of the
origin and spread of sanctuary policies using an original dataset with
To reveal finer-grained
more than 800 sanctuary policies. 103
97. See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Subfederal Immigration Regulation
and the Trump Effect, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); see also infra Section

II.

98. Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 1.
99. Pham & Van, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, supra note 1.
102. See Lasch et al., Understanding “Sancutary Cities”, supra note 1.
103. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); Allan Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset (2019)
(on file with author). To create our original dataset, we merged four existing
databases that trace sanctuary policy enactments and conducted online research using
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constitutional and federalism features, we place sanctuary policies
into temporal categories, like the legal typologies, 104 from 1979 to
2018. 105 Our policy data focuses only on formally enacted sanctuary
policies, similar to Gonzales, Collingwood, and El-Khatib’s dataset,106
but is constructed with different analytical goals. Their methodology
treats all sanctuary policies enacted from 2002 to 2008 as homogenous
in order to test for a causal effect on crime, 107 whereas our dataset is
employed in this Article to reveal policy variation from 1979 to
2018. 108 We only include policies that we are able to identify,
catalogue, and qualitatively categorize into distinctive periods based
on variations between policies. 109
Our approach focuses on patterns in sanctuary policy development
over large spans of time. 110 For example, a Trump effect emerges in
Qualitative analysis showing the connection between
2017. 111
jurisdictions passing multiple policies before and after 2017, however,
grounds the Trump effect as endogenous to the immigrant rights

LexisNexis, ProQuest, and Google search engines to identify and download sanctuary
policies. For the four databases that were merged together, see Bryan Griffith &
Jessica M. Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. IMMIGR.
STUD. (last updated Apr. 16, 2019), https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Countiesand-States [https://perma.cc/QGU7-7FVD]; Lasch et al., supra note 1; LAWS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES, supra note 92; Resolutions and Ordinances Critical of
the USA PATRIOT Act and Other Laws and Policies that Diminish Civil Liberties,
OBSERVATORIO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y POLÍTICA MIGRATORIA (Oct. 26, 2004),
http://observatoriocolef.org/_admin/documentos/Ordinances%20patriot%20act..pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5FA-DWC3]. When merging the four existing datasets, we
focused only on identifying policies enacted by governments and law enforcement
agencies, included only accessible policies that could be downloaded and coded, and
removed policies that were misclassified by the datasets as a sanctuary policy.
104. See, e.g., Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1.
105. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
106. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 7.
107. See id. at 33; see also Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on
file with author).
108. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Pham & Van, supra note 97, at 2. Sixty-eight local government sanctuary
policies were enacted in 2017, which far exceeded all other years from 1979 to 2018
by over forty-four policies (with twenty-four local government sanctuary policies
enacted in 2006 being the second largest spread in a single year). See Colbern,
Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
More policies were enacted under President Trump, but these emerged primarily
from progressive jurisdictions that had previously enacted sanctuary and other
integration policies, well before the national elections in 2016.
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movement occurring within states and localities. 112 We argue that
examining sanctuary policy development from historical and
comparative vantage points ensures that theorized causal mechanisms
are not simplified into a resistance-only explanation. 113 Part II of this
Article builds on immigration federalism scholarship to unpack how
federalism dynamics, court decisions, political parties, and social
movements combine together to shape sanctuary policy
development. 114
Our policy development approach provides a new framework for
thinking about how existing typologies link to state and local
immigrant rights movements. The two periods of immigration related
sanctuary developments (1979–1995 and 1996–2018) fundamentally
differ from sanctuary development period related to the USA
PATRIOT Act (the “Patriot Act”) (2001–2005). 115 The sanctuary
movement first led by churches grew into an immigrant rights
movement by the mid-1980s, with churches partnering with immigrant
rights organizations and state and local officials to enact local and
state sanctuary policies. 116 An even more robust immigrant rights
movement has emerged today that builds on many of the
organizations that fought for immigrants in the 1990s and that began
to gain legislative traction at the state and local levels after 2005.117
The Patriot Act-focused second sanctuary period is mostly
unconnected to the focus on immigration law in the first and third
periods of development. 118 Sections II.A., II.B., and II.C. of this
Article place sanctuary policies into distinctive periods and in
dialogue with immigration federalism scholarship to explain their
development. 119

112. See infra Section II.C.
113. See infra Part II.
114. See infra Part II.; see also COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8;
GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8; TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica W. Varsanyi
ed., 2010).
115. See infra Sections II.A., II.B., and II.C.
116. Norma Stoltz Chinchilla et al., The Sanctuary Movement and Central
American Activism in Los Angeles, 36 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 101, 101–03 (2009).
117. See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8; Allan Colbern & S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan, Citizens of California: How the Golden State Went from Worst to
First on Immigrant Rights, NEW POL. SCI., Apr. 2018, at 1, 2; S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package: Immigrant Integration and
the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, 6 POL’Y MATTERS, no. 3, Spring 2015, at 10
[hereinafter Ramakrishnan & Colbern, The California Package].
118. See infra Section II.B.
119. See infra Section II.A., II.B., and II.C.
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Local governments and local law enforcement passed 806 sanctuary
policies between 1979 and 2018. 120 We merged four existing
databases that trace sanctuary policy enactments along with
additional policies through original research of online news article
searches, which together were used to identify and catalogue all
accessible sanctuary policies for qualitative coding using Nvivo
software. 121 Our coding of each sanctuary policy for this Article
included determining: whether it was a resistance to immigration law
or to the Patriot Act; which groups were being protected with a focus
on United States citizens, all city residents, and specific immigrant
sub-groups (e.g., asylum seekers, undocumented immigrants); and
specific references to resisting or supporting federal and state
policies. 122
Through this coding scheme, we are able to map the spread of
three distinctive sanctuary policy developments: the first period
(1979–1995) and third period (1996–2018) are temporally connected
and similarly focused on resistance to immigration law; the second
period (2001–2005) overlaps temporally with the third period, but is

120. 806 total sanctuary policies were enacted: 265 by local governments opposing
immigration law, 180 by local law enforcement agencies opposing immigration law,
and 361 by local governments opposing the USA Patriot Act. See Colbern, Today’s
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
121. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
122. Id.
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focused on resistance to the Patriot Act (not immigration law). 123 It
is important to note that protections afforded to undocumented
immigrants by 2018 are far more robust than those given in 2006, but
they are part of the same period. 124 The third period has three
moments where major expansions in policy occur and evolves from
prioritizing certain classes of undocumented immigrants to protecting
all undocumented residents regardless of their criminal status. 125
Unpacking these evolutions in protection places our political
development approach into conversation with already developed
legal typologies. 126
A. Period 1: 1979–1995 Sanctuary from Immigration Law
The Refugee Act of 1980 brought U.S. law in line with
international human rights standards, specifically with the 1951
United Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. 127 The growing refugee crisis 128 from Central

123. The temporal overlap of qualitatively distinctive sanctuary policy
developments that we highlight has not yet been recognized by scholars using
sanctuary policy-data. Yet, it has important consequences for how sanctuary policies
are examined, especially explaining their timing and sequencing over time. For
example, the Gonzalez dataset includes 2 sanctuary policies enacted in Alaska
(Anchorage (2003) and Sitka (2003)) that resist the US Patriot Act, not immigration
law. The language used in the sanctuary policy of Anchorage focuses on the rights of
citizens, not asylum seekers or undocumented immigrants (“the Anchorage
Assembly reaffirms its support of the government of the United States of America in
its campaign against terrorism, and affirms its commitment that the campaign not be
waged at the expense of essential civil rights and liberties of citizens of this country
contained in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights”). See Res. No.
2003-223 (Anchorage Mun. Assembly, Alaska 2003); Res. No. 03-886 (City of Sitka,
Alaska 2003). Our dataset places these two particular policies into the second period
of development (2001-2005) as qualitatively distinct from immigrant rights
movements and resistance to immigration law enforcement. See Colbern, Sanctuary
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
124. For further analysis on this particular period, see infra Section II.C.
125. See infra Section II.C.
126. See, e.g., Lai & Lasch, supra note 1; Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary
Networks, supra note 1. For a greater discussion on these legal typologies, see also
discussion supra Section I.A.
127. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T 6223, 606 U.N.T.S 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); G.A. Res. 429
(V) (Dec. 14 1950).
128. The status of Central Americans and battle over asylum was politically
animated, particularly over the distinction between refugees, asylum seekers, and
unauthorized immigrants. Refugees largely reside in camps outside U.S. territory
(for example, World War II’s Displaced Persons or today’s Syrian refugees), where
they are vetted for an extended period of time. Asylees enter U.S. territory and seek
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America in the early 1980s fit the newly enacted Refugee Act, which
was modeled after the Convention’s “well-founded fear of
persecution” standard. 129 Despite this transformation in refugee
policy, President Reagan’s foreign policy goals in opposition to leftist
revolutionary movements specific to Central America caused the
administration to officially consider Central Americans as economic
migrants, who were unlawfully residing in the United States. 130
Denying Central American migrants recognition as refugees was a
foreign policy choice made by the Reagan administration intended to
mask the link between the United States foreign military aid and the
civil wars in Central America. 131 Throughout the 1980s, the U.S.
government continued to deny political asylum to Central American
applicants on the basis that they were fleeing economic stagnation
and generalized conditions of violence, not political persecution. 132
asylum as entrants making their claims on U.S. soil. Undocumented immigrants
reside inside U.S. territory without authorization by the federal government.
Throughout this Article, we use all three terms interchangeably to highlight the
contentiousness of Central American’s status inside the U.S. that was at the heart of
the sanctuary movement, but mostly refer to them as refugees. Civil wars and
violence in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras led to large-scale
migration, beginning slowly from 1970 to 1979 with an average of 7834 migrants
entering the United States per year, which grew dramatically in the 1980s and peaked
with 136,000 migrants entering unlawfully in 1990, with an estimated 450,000
undocumented migrants entering from 1980–1995. See generally Douglas S. Massey,
Children of Central American Turmoil and the U.S. Reform Impasse, SCHOLARS
STRATEGY NETWORK (Aug. 2, 2014).
129. See Refugee Act of 1980 § 101 (describing the “fear of persecution”
standard).
130. See GARCIA, supra note 88, at 84.
131. Revolutions led to violent civil wars that devastated the economic
infrastructure and displaced millions. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Revolution of
1979, a leftist movement that overthrew a repressive Anastasio Somoza government,
sparked a civil war. President Jimmy Carter sought to work with the Sandinista
regime, but these efforts ended in 1981 when President Reagan aimed to overthrow
the Sandinista regime by sending military aid and helping train the Contras, a rightwing militant group. The Reagan administration also funded right-wing leaders of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to prevent leftist revolutions from spreading,
exacerbating civil wars in these countries. Central Americans in all four countries
fled north to Mexico, the United States, and Canada to escape violence and economic
catastrophe. See id.
132. A class action lawsuit was filed in 1981 on behalf of Salvadorans and
Guatemalans detained at the INS facility at Los Fresnos, Texas, on the grounds that
they were denied basic rights, including the right to legal counsel. The court issued an
injunction in January 1982 prohibiting the INS from denying detainees their rights.
See Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 581 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Salvadoran plaintiffs
initiated a nationwide challenge to the adjudication process and claimed that they
had fled political persecution in hopes of finding refuge in the United States and were
denied procedural and substantive rights, including the INS failing to advise
detainees of their rights to counsel, to apply for asylum, to have a hearing before
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The United States’ church sanctuary movement to harbor and aid
refugees and asylum seekers emerged as a reaction to federal policy,
which preserved a temporary protected status almost exclusively for
migrants fleeing communist regimes or governments viewed as hostile
to United States interests. 133 On March 24, 1982, Southside
Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona and five churches in
Berkeley, California, publicly declared themselves as sanctuaries for
Central American refugees, 134 who the federal government deemed
unlawfully present, and led the country into a new sanctuary
movement. 135 Over the short span of a few years, the sanctuary
movement developed into a national network of churches and
synagogues that harbored and transported Central Americans,
protecting them from deportation. 136 An estimated forty-five church
sanctuaries were declared in 1983, which grew to over three hundred
by 1987. 137

1. Church Sanctuary Movement
The church-based sanctuary movement originated in 1981 with Jim
Corbett, a Quaker goat rancher in Tucson, Arizona, who assisted
Central Americans in crossing the U.S. border unlawfully. 138 Federal
officials routinely forced asylum-seekers, who lacked legal assistance,
to sign voluntary departure forms, which led to their deportation back
to Central America. 139 Corbett therefore sought to facilitate access to
asylum by connecting with the Manzo Area Council in Tucson and
forming the Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force on Central
America (TEC), both of which aided refugees detained by

deportation, and coercing them to accept “voluntary departure.” The court issued a
temporary injunction against the INS. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp.
351, 354 (C.D. Cal. 1982). In 1988, the court issued a permanent injunction against
the INS. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1505 (1988); see also
Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American
Asylum Seekers, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 574 (2011).
133. President Reagan and GOP allies in Congress considered Central Americans
in the 1980s, specifically those fleeing Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, not as refugees welcomed under the Refugee Act of 1980, but rather, as
economic migrants who unlawfully entered the U.S. and were subject to removal.
See Coutin, supra note 132, at 576.
134. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 99–100.
137. Chinchilla et al., supra note 116, at 106–07.
138. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 98.
139. See PIERRETTE HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, GOD’S HEART HAS NO BORDERS:
HOW RELIGIOUS ACTIVISTS ARE WORKING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 144–45 (2008).

518

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at the border by
posting bonds for their release, offering legal assistance in
deportation hearings, and preparing asylum applications. 140
On June 26, 1981, Corbett had taken three Salvadoran refugees
into the Tucson INS office to apply for political asylum, with the
understanding that INS allowed asylum applicants to go free while
their applications were being reviewed, if they were under the custody
of a local minister. 141 William Johnson, Tucson INS director, instead
ordered them to be arrested and set their bail at $3,000 each, a
significant increase from previous bail amounts. 142 Moreover, INS
director Johnson said that he was under orders from the State
Department not to grant asylum to Salvadorans and that all
applicants in the future would be arrested and sent to El Centro, the
local jail. 143 Realizing that he was unable to work with INS directly to
fight for asylum under federal law, Corbett turned to a strategy of
grassroots resistance. 144 This incident sparked the church sanctuary
movement. 145
Corbett approached members of the Tucson community, including
Southside Presbyterian minister John Fife, about building up a local
network of safe houses, and began building contacts in Mexico to
provide temporary housing and help aid in the illegal transportation
of refugees across the Mexico-U.S. border. 146 In November 1981, the
Church voted in favor of serving as a safe house for Central American
refugees. 147 A few months later, in January 1982, Southside voted
fifty-nine to two in favor of becoming a sanctuary by secret ballot,
which shielded sanctuary workers from the anti-harboring provision
of federal immigration law. 148 As part of its moral resistance to
federal policy, Southside set March 24, 1982 as the date they would
publicly declare themselves a sanctuary. 149 This date was symbolic
because it was the second anniversary of the assassination of Oscar
Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador and vocal critic of U.S. refugee

140. Id. at 144; see CHRISTIAN SMITH, RESISTING REAGAN: THE U.S. CENTRAL
AMERICA PEACE MOVEMENT 64–65 (2010).
141. SMITH, supra note 140, at 64.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 65.
144. See GARCIA, supra note 88, at 98.
145. SMITH, supra note 140, at 59–86.
146. Id. at 98–99.
147. Id. at 99.
148. Id. at 67, 99; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) (establishing that bringing in,
transporting, and harboring aliens in the United States is a violation of the law).
149. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99.
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policy. 150 This choice linked the church’s declaration of sanctuary to
an international movement opposing U.S. foreign policy, because
Romero was a visible figure who urged Presidents Carter and Reagan
to end their military aid to the Salvadoran army, which he considered
to be responsible for the civil war. 151
An effective sanctuary movement required a network of safe
houses across the United States and international borders. Corbett
and task force members sent “Dear Friend” letters 152 to
congregations and over five hundred Quaker meetings throughout
the country, asking them to join the movement. Corbett wrote: “if
Central American refugees’ rights to political asylum are decisively
rejected by the U.S. government or if the U.S. legal system insists on
ransom that exceeds our ability to pay, active resistance will be the
only alternative to abandoning the refugees to their fate.”153
Between January and March 1982, five churches in Berkeley,
California, and a few churches in Los Angeles, California,
Washington, D.C., and Lawrence, New York, agreed to declare
sanctuary. 154 In addition to the growing church sanctuary movement,
activists placed pressure on federal officials to change their asylum
policy towards Central Americans. In a letter to U.S. Attorney
General William French Smith, Fife explained:
We take this action because we believe the current policy and
practice of the US government with regard to Central American
refugees is illegal and immoral. We believe our government is in
violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and international law by
continuing to arrest, detain, and forcibly return refugees to terror,
persecution, and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala. 155

Meanwhile, Tucson sanctuary leaders contacted media outlets to
spread their statement against federal policy nationwide and to make
the March 24 sanctuary declarations a national event. 156
The movement took on a new national presence in 1982 when the
Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA) joined

150. See id. at 20–23.
151. See id. at 21.
152. SMITH, supra note 140, at 63 (explaining that Corbett wrote a series of “Dear
Friend” letters to over five hundred Quaker meetings explaining the plight of the
refugees and criticizing INS practices of deporting refugees without legal counsel).
153. Id. at 63–64.
154. Id. at 67; GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99.
155. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99.
156. Id.
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and took over coordinating efforts to grow the movement. 157 In
addition to coordinating the transportation and placement of refugees
at churches and houses throughout the United States, the Chicago
Task Force printed and distributed various “nuts-and-bolts” manuals
for sanctuary organizers with detailed instructions on every phase of
the process and how to use it as a political tool. 158 While church
sanctuaries were decentralized and local in nature, the Chicago Task
Force provided organization and a strategic roadmap for growing the
number of churches from Southwestern to Midwestern states. 159
By early 1983, there were forty-five sanctuary churches and
synagogues throughout the country and six hundred secondary
sanctuary groups that endorsed the movement but were not actively
involved in harboring. 160 This increased to 150 churches by mid-1984
with eighteen national religious denominations and commissions
endorsing the movement. 161 In 1985, 250 churches declared sanctuary
and the Central Conference of American Rabbis endorsed the
Sanctuary movement, including its civil disobedience strategies. 162 By
1985, the movement had also grown from secular institutions to
include universities and state and local governments. 163

2. Moral Activism Evolves into Federalism Conflict Over Policy
Concurrent to their grassroots efforts, sanctuary leaders built up a
national coalition with U.S. Senators and Representatives in states
that directly experienced the rise of Central American asylum seekers
and where church sanctuaries had formed. Congressional leaders
spearheaded efforts to reform national policy, first through pressuring
the White House to grant Central Americans “extended voluntary
departure,” followed by passing legislation to provide “temporary
protected status.” 164 Sanctuary activism evolved into two distinctive
national policy areas. On foreign policy, activists connected the
international Central American Peace Movement through their
157. Chinchilla et al., supra note 116, at 106.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 107.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 89, 112 (“Extended Voluntary Departure, or EVD,
is a discretionary status given to a group of people when the State Department
determines that conditions in the sending country make it is dangerous for them to
return.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) (2018) (providing background on voluntary
departure).
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Democratic Congressional allies to pressure President Reagan’s
administration to end its policy of U.S. military involvement and aid
in Central America. 165 On federal law, activists merged their local
sanctuary cause with ongoing bipartisan efforts to pass
comprehensive immigration policy. Until 1985, activists saw federal
law as a viable and ideal option, but repeated failure to change
presidential policy or pass legislation led them to reconsider local and
state sanctuary policies.
The first federal reform effort began in April 1981. Representative
Ted Weiss (D-NY), joined by 31 sponsors, introduced HR 126,
“expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that extended
voluntary departure status should be granted to El Salvadorans in the
United States whose safety would be endangered if they were
required to return to El Salvador.” 166 One year later, Senator Dennis
DeCocinni (D-AZ), introduced a Senate version of the resolution, SR
336, to the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy,
along with co-sponsor Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).167
The two non-binding Congressional resolutions were a display of
Democratic support for the sanctuary movement, with the goal of
pressuring President Reagan to grant early voluntary departure
(EVD) status to Salvadoran asylum seekers. Democratic allies of the
sanctuary movement called on the Secretary of State, after passing
the resolutions, to recommend to the Attorney General that asylum
seekers from El Salvador be granted EVD status. 168
Reagan responded in 1981 by creating a Task Force that not only
recommended the administration to continue resisting EVD, but also
warned Reagan of the “demographic consequences” of Latin
American immigration. 169 Representative John Joseph Moakley (DMA) sent letters to President Reagan in 1982, challenging the
President to change his policy on El Salvador. He referenced a
United Nations Human Rights Commission report, estimating that
over 9000 political murders had occurred in El Salvador in 1981
alone, and called U.S. foreign policy “unconscionable.” 170 All non-

165. See GARCIA, supra note 88, at 93; SMITH, supra note 140, at 92.
166. H.R. Res. 126, 97th Cong (1981).
167. S. Res. 336, 97th Cong. (1982).
168. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 96.
169. Id. at 203 n.28.
170. Letter from John Joseph Moakley, Member, House of Representatives, to
Ronald Reagan, President of the United States (Feb. 1, 1982) (on file with Suffolk
University, Moakley Archive & Institute, Series 03.04 Legislative Assistant Files: Jim
McGovern, Box 1 Folder 1 (shelf locator)).
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binding efforts to pressure President Reagan into changing his stance
failed, causing Democratic allies of the sanctuary movement to
change strategy.
After failing to change presidential policy, Senator DeConcinni
and Representative Moakley introduced House Resolution 822 and
Senate Bill 377 in 1985, both asking for Congressional review of the
crisis and to grant Salvadoran asylum seekers temporary stay of
deportation. 171 DeConcinni and Moakley’s legislative efforts were
not put up for a vote, but they were able to add EVD to the omnibus
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 172 However, IRCA
passed without a solution to the refugee crisis because President
Reagan threatened to veto the bill in 1985 if a provision allowing for
EVD status to Central Americans was not removed. 173 This further
exacerbated the refugee crisis. The newly enacted immigration law
created federal sanctions on employers for hiring undocumented
workers, an amnesty program for undocumented immigrants who
entered the country prior to January 1, 1982, a guest worker program,
and funding for border enforcement. 174 Since the majority of Central
Americans arrived in the United States after 1982, this made them
ineligible for amnesty and employment in the United States. 175
Concurrent to the federal reform efforts, city governments with
direct ties to church sanctuary began to get involved. On June 7,
1983, Madison, Wisconsin passed the first city resolution commending
the local St. Francis House and associated congregation “for their
compassion and moral courage in providing sanctuary to refugees
from El Salvador and Guatemala.” 176 The following year, in response
to an immigration raid conducted by INS, San Jose, California moved
to limit local officials including law enforcement from partnering with
INS on raids or enforcing immigration laws. 177 The sanctuary policy

171. H.R. Res. 822, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 377, 99th Cong. (1985).
172. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
CONTROL IN AMERICA 267 (2002); see generally Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
173. TICHENOR, supra note 172, at 267.
174. 100 Stat. at 3360, 3381, 3394 (1986); GARCIA, supra note 88, at 90.
175. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 91; Lydia Chavez, Refugee Wave Creates a Crisis
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
1987),
in
Border
City,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/28/nyregion/refugee-wave-creates-a-crisis-in-bordercity.html [https://perma.cc/3QPS-YRM2].
176. Res. 39,105 (Madison, Wis. 1983); see also Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves,
supra note 37, at 176 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Colbern,
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
177. See Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” — Online Appendix, WESTMINSTER
LAW
LIBRARY,
http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342&p=5009807
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movement spread and peaked in 1985, with eighteen cities in ten
different states. 178 Between 1985 and 1987, four states passed a form
of state-wide sanctuary that ended their cooperation with INS
investigations or arrests of Central American refugees, pledged their
support for the church moral sanctuary movement, and supported the
end goal of national reform. 179 By the end of 1987, twenty-eight cities
enacted sanctuary policies, some of which enacted more than one
policy. 180

The growing federalism conflict explains the timing of this spread
in local government sanctuary policies. It was a response in cities and
states where church sanctuary were visible and INS raids were
conducted, fueled by federal inaction on the refugee crisis and federal
prosecution of sanctuary workers. In San Jose’s motion, the city
council refers to the possibility that the Immigration Reform Act of
1984 would provide national amnesty to Central Americans, but the
provisions added by Senator DeConcinni and Representative
[https://perma.cc/XE3C-GN3E] [hereinafter Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”
Appendix] (containing San Jose’s Motion concerning U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Service Enforcement Policies (Apr. 24, 1984)).
178. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 176 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103
(on file with author).
179. H.R. 2314, 64th Legis. Assemb. (Or. 1987); Exec. Order No. 257 (Mass., Oct.
4, 1985); New Mexico Is Declared Sanctuary for Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30,
1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/30/us/new-mexico-is-declared-sanctuary-forrefugees.html [https://perma.cc/7EUA-LAXA]; Res. No. 1457 (N.Y.S. Assembly,
N.Y. 1986); Inventory of the New Mexico Sanctuary Defense Committee Collection,
1986-1988, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ONLINE ARCHIVES (2000),
https://rmoa.unm.edu/docviewer.php?docId=nmar1988-054.xml#idp1604624
[https://perma.cc/5X3C-ZKH3] (noting the establishment of the New Mexico
Sanctuary Defense Committee in 1987).
180. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 107.
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Moakley were removed in 1986 under Reagan’s threat to veto the
bill. 181
The federal government also began to prosecute and criminally
charge church sanctuary workers for illegally transporting and
harboring Central Americans. The INS led a year-long covert
investigation called Operation Sojourner from 1984 to 1985, where
informants worked undercover with Arizona-based church
sanctuaries in order to gather evidence and details about the
workers. 182 This operation led to the Tucson Trials in January 1985,
where U.S. prosecutor Donald Reno successfully blocked all evidence
relating to defendants’ religious and humanitarian motives, U.S.
foreign policy, human rights abuses, and the asylum process. 183 This
ruling prevented the defense team from arguing that the sanctuary
workers were aiding Central Americans in accessing asylum, and the
court considered only their role in transporting and harboring illegal
immigrants. 184 The federal prosecutor portrayed the sanctuary
movement as a “criminal venture” rather than “church-based
ministry.” 185 This fueled church activists to turn their moral cause
into a federalism conflict rooted in city sanctuary policies that were
shielded under the Constitution.

3. Shared Features of Sanctuary Policies
In the 1980s, state and local sanctuary policies shared many
features. They highlighted the United States’ obligation to help all
refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980, made explicit solidarity with
churches and private citizens’ sanctuary movements, and connected
sanctuary to America’s national heritage. The primary change that
occurred from church sanctuary, which was largely underground in
operation but highly publicized as a moral opposition to federal
policy, was that government sanctuary policies at the state and local
levels directly resisted enforcement of federal immigration law by
limiting its capacity. Unlike church sanctuary, government sanctuary

181. Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” Appendix, supra note 177.
182. Kristina M. Campbell, Operation Sojourner: The Government Infiltration of

the Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s and its Legacy on the Modern Central
American Refugee Crisis, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 474, 480 (2017).
183. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 106.
184. Id. at 106–07.
185. Bill Curry, 8 of 11 Activists Guilty in Alien Sanctuary Case: Defiant Group
Says 6-Month Trial Hasn’t Ended Movement to Help Central American Refugees,
L.A. TIMES (May 2, 1986), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-05-02-mn3211-story.html [https://perma.cc/LFD8-EHG2].
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was considered a constitutionally legitimate form of resistance where
government officials could provide services and aid to undocumented
residents without the same threat of federal prosecution that was
placed over church sanctuary workers.
Most city sanctuary policies included provisions prohibiting city
employees and departments from requesting or sharing information
on immigration status, and from using legal immigration status as a
condition for receiving municipal benefits. Berkeley, California’s
1985 resolution encouraged residents of the city to “work with the
existing sanctuaries to provide the necessary housing, transportation,
food, medical aid, legal assistance and friendship” to Central
Americans. 186 Its policy also barred city officials and employees from
partnering with INS to enforce federal immigration law and barred
them from interfering in the work of church sanctuaries or provision
of public services to “Central American refugees.” 187 Similarly,
Chicago’s 1985 executive order encouraged “equal access by all
persons residing in the City of Chicago, regardless of nation of birth
or current citizenship, to the full benefits, opportunities and services,
including employment and the issuance of licenses, which are
provided or administered by the City of Chicago.” 188 It also stated
that “[n]o agent or agency shall request information about or
otherwise investigate or assist in the investigation of the citizenship or
residency status of any person,” and that “[n]o agent or agency shall
disseminate information regarding the citizenship or residency status
of any person.” 189 A few cities, including Duluth, Minneapolis, and
Ithaca, New York, included requests that the INS notify advocacy
organizations of any arrests of Central Americans made within their
city. 190

186. Res. 52,596 (Cty. Council of Berkeley, Cal. 1985); see also Colbern, Today’s
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 175, 177(unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
187. Res. 52,596 (Cal. 1985); see also Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note
37, at 175, 177 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Colbern, Sanctuary
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
188. Exec. Order No. 85-1 (Chi. Ill., Mar. 7, 1985); see also Colbern, Today’s
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 175 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
189. Exec. Order No. 85-1 (Chi. Ill., Mar. 7, 1985); see also Colbern, Today’s
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 175 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
190. Res. 84-0485 (Cty. Council of Duluth, Minn. 1984); Res. 85R-042 (Cty.
Council of Minneapolis, Minn. 1985); see Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”
Appendix, supra note 177 (containing Ithaca’s Resolution Sanctuary For Salvadoran
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The significance of government sanctuary policies for the
immigrant populations went well beyond severing local officials and
resources from enforcing federal immigration law. They began to
address issues of inequality and discrimination, and they expanded
access to resources and public benefits. Sanctuary often meant an
expansion of belonging by including all immigrants, regardless of
their legal status.
The policies also began to recognize the
constitutional rights of immigrants, which would become much more
pronounced in the second (1996–2018) and third (2001–2005) periods
of sanctuary policy development. 191 They alleged that the federal
government violated the plaintiffs’ (the arrested sanctuary workers)
First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion by infiltrating
churches during Operation Sojourner, making the sanctuary workers’
arrests unlawful. 192 They also alleged that the federal government’s
discriminatory adjudication of Central Americans’ requests for
asylum violated their Fifth Amendment rights. 193 The ABC case
lasted six years before it was settled January 31, 1991, marking
another important national victory for the sanctuary movement by
reopening nearly 150,000 asylum cases and letting over 100,000 more
Central Americans apply for new decisions. 194
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca marked the first national success of the
sanctuary movement, holding that an asylum applicant only needs to
demonstrate a “well-founded fear” of persecution, which made the
asylum process for Central American applicants more equal to that of
applicants from other countries. 195 The Immigration Act of 1990
included a provision by Representative Moakley that offered
eighteen months of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Salvadoran
refugees and made them eligible to apply for asylum after TPS
ended. 196 That same year, the federal government officially “agreed
[to] stop detaining and deporting most [undocumented] immigrants
and Guatemalan Refugees dated July 10, 1985); see also Colbern, Today’s Runaway
Slaves, supra note 37, at 30 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
191. See infra Sections II.B. and II.C.
192. Carolyn Patty Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh: Landmark Victory for Central American Asylum Seekers, 3 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 327, 351 (1991).
193. Id.
194. Katherine Bishop, U.S. Adopts New Policy for Hearings on Political Asylum
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
1990),
for
Some
Aliens,
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/20/us/us-adopts-new-policy-for-hearings-onpolitical-asylum-for-some-aliens.html [https://perma.cc/P2U4-L8BJ]; see generally
Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
195. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1987).
196. TICHENOR, supra note 172, at 274.
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from El Salvador and Guatemala and to adopt new procedures for
The Nicaraguan
their applications for political asylum.” 197
Adjustment and Permanent Central American Relief Act of 1997,
which granted legal permanent residency to Nicaraguans and other
foreign nationals so long as they were registered asylum seekers
residing in the U.S. for at least five years since December 1995,
marked the culmination of the sanctuary movement’s effort to reform
U.S. policy by granting Central American refugees a pathway to legal
permanent residency. 198
The enactment of sanctuary policies had generally died down as a
result of reforms to the asylum process through I.N.S v. CardozaFonseca and federal reform to immigration law in 1990. After 1987,
most new sanctuary policies were enacted by cities that had already
passed a policy. Chicago passed a second executive order in 1989 that
mirrored the provisions on equal access and non-enforcement of
immigration law made in its first order in 1985. 199 Similarly, New
York City’s Mayor Koch issued a second executive order in 1989 that
reaffirmed his 1985 order prohibiting city officials and employees
from providing information to INS about immigration status, with the
exception of immigrants who had criminal records. 200 Somerville,
Massachusetts revised its 1987 sanctuary policy in 1989, adding a
specific reference to the stalled federal bill, House Bill 618, proposed
by its very own Congressman Moakley, which asked for an in-depth
Government Accountability Office study of the conditions in Central
America, especially in El Salvador, and urged Congress to apply the
report’s findings in future policy reforms. 201
San Francisco passed multiple policies in the 1980s and 1990s in
response to federal enforcement in the city, which expanded
sanctuary in important ways. Its 1985 policy declared its support for
church sanctuaries, made it clear that immigration law is a matter of
federal and not local jurisdiction, and urged city officials and

197. Bishop, supra note 194.
198. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105–100, § 202, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997); see also id. §203.
199. Exec. Order No. 89-6 (Office of the Mayor of the City of Chi., Ill. 1989); see
also Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 176 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
200. Exec. Order No. 124 (Office of the Mayor of the City of N.Y.C., N.Y. 1989);
see also Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 176 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
201. Res. 150870 (Bd. of Aldermen, City of Somerville, Mass. 1989); see also
Central American Studies and Temporary Relief Act of 1987, H.R. 618, 100th Cong.
(1987).
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employees not to discriminate based on immigration status, nor
“jeopardize the safety and welfare of law-abiding refugees by acting
in a way that may cause their deportation.” 202 Its 1989 policy went
much further, declaring that “No department, agency, commission
officer or employee . . . shall use any City funds or resources to assist
in the enforcement of federal immigration law” and placed the city’s
Human Rights Commission in charge of overseeing compliance with
the sanctuary policy. 203 Three years later, in 1992, San Francisco
passed a third sanctuary policy highlighting that immigration raids
and enforcement continued to be a problem for the city.204 It
reaffirmed its sanctuary policies and added a requirement for the city
police department and county sheriff’s department to provide a
report to the city about its implementation of the policy and any
persons they have reported to INS. 205
B. Period 2: 2001–2005: Sanctuary from the Patriot Act
The spread of sanctuary policies between 2001 and 2005 neither
focused on federal immigration law, nor intended to protect
undocumented immigrants. Our dataset reveals that Period 2 is
composed of 361 city government policies that far outnumber the
cumulative 265 city government policies protecting Central American
refugees and undocumented immigrants in the first and third periods
combined. 206 The large number of sanctuary policies emerged in a
short span of time in part because of bipartisan local resistance
movements against the federal government’s local orientation in
fighting terrorism after September 11, 2001. 207 The Patriot Act
threatened citizens and non-citizens alike with federal surveillance

202. Res. 1087-85 (Bd. of Supervisors, S.F., Cal. 1985); see also Colbern, Today’s
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 189 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
203. Res. 375-89 (Bd. of Supervisors, S.F., Cal. 1989); see also Colbern, Today’s
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 190 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
204. Res. 282-92 (Bd. of Supervisors, S.F., Cal. 1992).
205. Res. 282-92 (Bd. of Supervisors, S.F., Cal. 1992).
206. Note that a total of 445 sanctuary policies were enacted between Periods 1
and 3 to protect immigrants of varying legal statuses, when combining local
government and local law enforcement policies together. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy
Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
207. Our dataset highlights that both Democratic and Republican controlled states
and localities enacted sanctuary policies during the second period. This starkly
contrasts with policies falling within the first and third periods, which originate from
mostly Democratic states and localities. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra
note 103 (on file with author).
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and local enforcement initiatives. 208 Republican and Democratic
states and cities across the country responded by enacting similar
sanctuary policies as the 1980s, but tailored them towards resisting the
Patriot Act. 209 Some protected only U.S. citizens, while others
protected all residents including undocumented immigrants, but the
vast majority used vague language of protecting all local residents
without the mention of citizenship or legal immigration status. 210

In the months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress unilaterally
passed the Patriot Act with bipartisan support, with provisions that
gave local law enforcement the ability to bypass alerting suspects of
impeding warrants or searches, and providing them easier access to
warrants to search businesses and business records. 211 This raised
deep constitutional concerns over the rights of citizens and noncitizens alike. The Patriot Act also sought to increase information
sharing between local law enforcement and federal government
agencies and to enhance surveillance technology to fight against
online threats. 212
Unlike the 1980s, the local response to the Patriot Act was not
fueled by a church movement in the beginning. States and cities

208. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
209. See infra Section II.B.2.
210. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
211. USA PATRIOT Act § 213 (authorizing delayed notice of the execution of
criminal search warrants).
212. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: PRESERVING LIFE AND
LIBERTY
(2003),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
[https://perma.cc/MEA8-AERZ].
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across the country responded with pressure to change federal law and
passed 361 local government sanctuary policies from 2001 to 2005.213
The robust and quick spread of sanctuary policies was the result of a
bipartisan movement and national crisis, mainly over the Tenth
Amendment, but with profound implications for the constitutional
principles that underpin all sanctuary laws.

1. Constitutional Issues Raised in Sanctuary Policies
The Patriot Act raised a number of fundamental concerns over
safeguarding Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.214
Minority groups, especially undocumented immigrants, were
particularly vulnerable after 9/11 due to the government’s expansion
of immigration law by making it a powerful criminal justice tool and
vehicle for expanding federal and local partnerships to apprehend,
incarcerate, and deport noncitizens with criminal convictions and
suspected terrorists. 215 It is important to note that the blurring of
immigration enforcement and anti-terrorism efforts began much
earlier, when the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) were passed in 1996. 216 AEDPA and
IIRIRA together “criminalized” immigration law and set up the legal
foundation for the Patriot Act to expand federal power in the interior
of the country, marking a major shift in American federalism. 217

213. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author); see
also USA PATRIOT Act § 203 (empowering law enforcement officials to share

criminal investigative information that contains foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence, including grand jury and wiretap information, with intelligence,
protective, immigration, national-defense, and national-security personnel).
214. See generally John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring

Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot
Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081

(2002) (analyzing the ways in which the aftermath of 9/11 and the creation of the
Patriot Act have led to an erosion of civil rights and liberties through increased
federal surveillance inside the United States and the Department of Justice’s practice
of denying counsel to its detainees). See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V.
215. See Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and
Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 85–86 (2005).
216. See id. at 83–84; see generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (limiting the power of
federal courts to provide relief under habeas corpus); Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
217. IIRIRA criminalized many aspects of immigrant lives, expanded border
enforcement, enhanced penalties and enforcement against smuggling and document
fraud, and heightened interior enforcement to deport unlawfully residing immigrants.
Austin T. Fragomen, The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
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Formed in 2001, the Civil Liberties Task Force of the ACLU
spearheaded the Bill of Rights movement across states and
localities. 218 On the one hand, state governments were unclear as to
whether the Patriot Act had fundamentally altered federalism to
empower the federal government to deputize local law enforcement,
or worse, to mandate these partnerships. 219 The traditional outwardlooking role of the federal government was increasingly being turned
inward to counter acts of terrorism. 220 Concerns about federal
encroachment on state power were combined with concerns about
protecting individual civil liberty and due process, which led to
sanctuary policies passed from 2001 to 2005 specifically referencing
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 221
In 2003, a proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act (DSEA)
was leaked to the public and fueled the major spread of local
sanctuary policies, which grew from 23 policies passed in 2002, to 216

Act of 1996: An Overview, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 438, 438 (1997). AEDPA was a
strongly anti-immigrant legislation concealed in anti-terrorism language, which
severely limited the constitutional rights and protections formerly offered to legal
immigrants. Lisa Solbakken explains, by getting rid of a “judicial review after a final
deportation order premised upon an enumerated conviction” as well as extending the
crimes eligible for a deportation order, AEDPA removed due process rights from
both legal and undocumented immigrants. Lisa C. Solbakken, The Anti-Terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an AntiTerrorism Pretext, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1382–83 (1997).
218. Ion Bogdan Vasi & David Strang, Civil Liberty in America: The Diffusion of
Municipal Bill of Rights Resolutions After the Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act,

114 AM. J. SOC. 1716, 1721 (2009).
219. See Susan Herman, Introduction to Trager Symposium: Our New Federalism?
National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1201, 1225 (2004).
220. See id. at 1205–06.
221. Berkeley’s Resolution specifically refers to these all of these constitutional
protections: First Amendment (right to the establishment of religion, freedom of
speech, peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances), Fourth Amendment (right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, and protection from
warrantless arrest); Fifth Amendment (right to not be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself); Sixth Amendment (right to a speedy, fair trial,
amongst a public jury and with legal counsel); Eighth Amendment (right to not be
subject to cruel and unusual punishment); Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment (right to
due process and equal protection rights regardless of citizenship or immigration
status). Minutes from the Peace and Justice Commission Regular Meeting, City of
Berkeley
(Nov.
2,
2003),
https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Commissions/peaceandjustice/2003peaceandjustice/p
df/110303M30.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C8L-RMFN] [hereinafter Peace and Justice
Commission Minutes]. Most of the sanctuary policies included similar constitutional
references. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
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policies passed in 2003. 222 The bill went beyond the Patriot Act’s
expansion of federal counterterrorism powers through FISA
surveillance warrants, criminalizing materials supporting terrorism,
and enhancing discretionary powers of law enforcement to remove
unauthorized immigrants. 223 Massive resistance at the local level,
through sanctuary policies, was paired with a large bipartisan
opposition in Congress that quickly defeated DSEA from even being
proposed in the House or Senate. 224 The newly formed coalition of
conservative and progressive members of Congress turned their
attention to amending provisions of the Patriot Act that threatened
privacy and civil liberties, and led an education campaign in the
House and Senate to ensure that reauthorization of the Patriot Act
would better protect constitutional rights. 225 With sunset provisions
in the Patriot Act set to expire in 2005, the second period of sanctuary
policy development had ended. 226

2. Shared Features of Sanctuary Policies
Progressive cities like Berkeley, Santa Cruz, and Ann Arbor
specifically crafted their resolutions to protect all residents, including
non-citizens such as refugees and immigrants. Their sanctuary
resolutions referred to specific provisions of the Patriot Act as
infringing on civil liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and
detailed the local government’s commitment to the rights of all
people. 227 The language provided by Berkeley’s sanctuary policy

222. Timothy Scahill, Comment, The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003:
A Glimpse into a Post-Patriot Act Approach to Combating Domestic Terrorism, 38
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 327, 328 (2004); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra

note 103 (on file with author).
223. See Scahill, supra note 222, at 346.
224. Id. at 341.
225. Id. at 341 n.99; see also USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.congress.gov/bill/109thcongress/house-bill/3199 [https://perma.cc/RK9K-P3XM].
226. The Patriot Act’s “sunsets” are provisions that expire unless Congress reauthorizes them, which included Title II, the main vehicle permitting federal
authorities to surveil, monitor and investigate Americans with fewer constitutional
checks on abuse like warrants. While most of these sunsets were extended under
reauthorization bills, the bipartisan sanctuary coalition largely dissolved by 2005 and
civil liberty groups re-focused in national reforms to the U.S. Patriot Act. Scahill,
supra note 222, at 337 (drawing the connection between the local sanctuary
movement and US Patriot Act sunset provisions).
227. Berkeley’s Resolution states that “the PATRIOT Act, directives from
Attorney General Ashcroft, and particular executive orders seem to target foreign
nationals and people of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, and anyone who
may legally speak or act to oppose government policy,” and then goes on to state
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from this period illustrates its distinctiveness from the first and third
periods, making no mention of immigration law. Instead, its focus
was on the detention of citizens and non-citizens under the Patriot
Act and the deep constitutional concerns raised by interior
enforcement related to anti-terrorism, including:
. . . freedom of speech, religion, assembly and privacy; the rights to
counsel and due process in judicial proceedings; and protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures, all of which are guaranteed by
the Constitution of California, the United States Constitution and its
Bill of Rights, and by United Nations Charter Article 55. 228

Like Berkeley, California’s policy, 361 policies enacted between 2001
and 2005 do not mention immigration law and were focused
exclusively on the Patriot Act. 229
Given the bipartisan nature of this second period of development,
a clear trend emerged in which progressive cities included all
residents or specifically referred to Muslims and immigrants, who
were targeted under the Patriot Act and by vigilante groups after
9/11. 230
Meanwhile, resolutions passed in more conservative
jurisdictions used language in their policies limiting sanctuary to
violations of the rights of U.S. citizens. 231 On October 7, 2003, for
example, Princeton Borough, New Jersey, enacted a sanctuary policy
referring to “the imperative to protect the fundamental rights and
liberties of the American people,” with no mention of immigrants or
other minorities. 232 This policy’s narrow focus on citizens helps to
illustrate that sanctuary policies are not exclusive to undocumented
immigrants, nor are they merely a type of resistance to federal law.
Sanctuary provides a vehicle for cities to advocate for their residents’

that, the “City of Berkeley includes a diverse community of students and working
families, including non-citizens, whose contributions to the community are vital to its
character and function.” See Peace and Justice Commission Minutes, supra note 221.
See also Ann Arbor City Council, Res. R-295-7-03, 2003 (Mich. 2003); City Council
of the City of Santa Cruz, Res. NS-26,032, 2002 (Cal. 2002); Colbern, Sanctuary
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
228. Peace and Justice Commission Minutes, supra note 221; Colbern, Sanctuary
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
229. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
230. Id.; see, e.g., City Council of the City of Seattle, Res. 30578, 2003 (Wash.
2003).
231. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
232. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of New Jersey Commends Princeton for
Passage of Pro-Civil Liberties Resolution (Oct. 8, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/aclu-new-jersey-commends-princeton-passage-pro-civil-libertiesresolution?redirect=cpredirect/17708 [https://perma.cc/32TM-DHWJ]; see Colbern,
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
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constitutional rights, and the policy’s level of inclusiveness is directly
shaped by the city’s relationship with its residents, including citizens,
legal immigrants, and undocumented immigrants.
One year later, on October 12, 2004, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (BICE) gave the Princeton Borough Police Department
notice that they were going to conduct an immigration raid to arrest
and detain undocumented immigrants. 233 During the raid, BICE
officers presented themselves as police officers, which created
mistrust between immigrant residents and local officials and police.234
Responding to the federal immigration raid, Princeton Borough
passed another sanctuary policy, this time expanding its language to
be inclusive of all residents. 235 Notably, while the policy still refers
specifically to the Patriot Act, it added that “the Borough of
Princeton is comprised of immigrants from throughout the world who
contribute to Princeton’s social vigor, cultural richness, and economic
vitality,” and it emphasized that the city “respects the rights of and
provides equal services to all individuals, regardless of race, ethnicity,
national origin, or immigration status. 236 This change from 2003 to
2004 by Princeton Borough helps to illustrate how sanctuary policies
emerge and evolve. Specific developments in federal law and
interactions with federal law enforcement raised constitutional
concerns that altered the city’s protection of its citizens and
immigrants alike.
At least ten jurisdictions enacted more than one sanctuary policy
between 2001 and 2005, often as a response to specific events that
sparked increased resistance. 237 Twenty-six sanctuary policies were
enacted that focused specifically on federal immigration law, with five
simultaneously focusing their opposition toward the Patriot Act. 238
This meant that the second (2001–2005) and third (1996–2018)
233. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004);

see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).

234. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004);

see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).

235. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004);

see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).

236. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004);

see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).

237. More than one policy was enacted in: Washington, D.C. (2003, 2005);
Philadelphia (2002, 2003); Seattle (2002, 2004, 2005); San Francisco (2002, 2005);
Detroit (2002, 2002); Minneapolis (2002, April 2003, July 2003); Albuquerque (2000,
2004); St. Paul (2004, 2005); New York (2003, 2005); and Watsonville (2004, 2005).
See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
238. Id.
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periods of sanctuary policy development were not entirely
disconnected, but they were very much distinct. The overlap between
the second and third periods included 361 policies focused only on
opposing the Patriot Act. 239 Federal law after 9/11 had a profound
impact on increasing the immigration enforcement power of federal
and local officials, but federal immigration law itself was not the core
concern mobilizing local resistance. The ACLU’s Bill of Rights
Movement was not connected specifically to the cause of resisting
immigration law enforcement. 240 Meanwhile, immigrant advocacy
organizations were almost entirely focused on national level reforms
in immigration law, not sanctuary, until 2006. 241 Moreover, the
second movement focused on the Patriot Act was led by bipartisan
groups and officials, at a time when partisanship divides were being
forged over immigration.
C. Period 3: 1996–2018 Sanctuary from Immigration Law
Directly following the first period (1979–1995), a few cities passed
sanctuary policies highlighting the harsh new immigration laws
enacted by the federal government in 1996. Denver’s policy in 1998
referenced the fundamental shift in federal law that denied legal
immigrants from being able to access federal public benefits, and
made it clear that this change was detrimental to its “children, senior
citizens, and disabled residents” and fostered a “climate of
Similarly, Austin passed a
intolerance and discrimination.” 242
resolution in 1997 referencing federal welfare reform and defended
immigrant residents by stating that such residents generally were not
dependent on welfare or public social services. 243 While new
jurisdictions joined the sanctuary movement after 1995, it was not
until 2006 that the movement began to gain new momentum in
response to harsh proposals for reforming federal immigration law.
Beyond the Patriot Act, the events of September 11, 2001 changed
the course of immigration. Officials and news anchors debating
immigration replaced “border security” with the term “border
control” to emphasize the counter-terrorism link to immigration

239. Id.
240. Vasi & Strang, supra note 218, at 1721.
241. COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 19; GULASEKARAM &
RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 81.
242. Exec. Order No. 116 (Office of the Mayor of the City of Denver, Colo. 1998);
Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
243. See Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” Appendix, supra note 177.
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enforcement. 244
This provided a new political frame for
245
restrictionists to push for harsh immigration laws at the national,
state, and local levels.
The timing of policy enactments in
immigration federalism, in terms of the activism for restrictive and
pro-immigrant policies at the state and local levels, illustrates the
distinction between the second and third sanctuary periods.
Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan trace the spread of policies as
occurring in two waves across states and localities, with antiimmigrant policies spreading first, from 2004 to 2012, and proimmigrant policies spreading much later, after 2010. 246 Thus, while
scholars have generally referred to the timeline of sanctuary as a
single spread of policies beginning in 2001, insights from immigration
federalism scholarship point towards a sanctuary movement with a
distinctive focus on federal immigration law after 2005. 247
The restrictionist wave that ushered in a new era of immigration
federalism is rooted in key political actors that redirected
policymaking away from the national level and towards the state and
local levels. Kris Kobach led this effort of redirecting restrictionists
to state and local policy. 248 In 2002, while working in the Department
of Justice, Kobach authored a memo seeking to change the DOJ’s
enforcement policy so that local police could make arrests for civil
violations of immigration law, which was soon adopted by the Office
of Legal Counsel. 249 A few years later, in 2004, Kobach turned his
sights on convincing major national organizations like FAIR and
NumbersUSA, who had previously led in pushing for harsher federal
immigration laws, to begin pushing anti-immigrant laws at the state

244. Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 28 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 613, 639 (2007).
245. “Restrictionists” are specific political actors seeking to spread a range of
restrictive state and local policies, including those that deny immigrants access to
state and local public benefits and services, ban them from renting apartments by
requiring proof of legal status, and involve entering into federal partnerships to
enforce immigration law. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8.
246. Id. at 59–60.
247. Trevor Gardner and Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien use the same National
Immigration Law Center dataset to analyze sanctuary policies from 2001 to 2008. See
Trevor G. Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the Anti-Commandeering Rule in the
Homeland Security Era: Immigrant Sanctuary as an Illustrative Case, 34 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 313, 325–26 (2015); Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien et al., The Politics of
Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration, 55 URB. AFF.
REV. 4, 11 (2019).
248. GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 100.
249. Id.
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and local levels of government. 250
FAIR’s legal wing, the
Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), began working together
with Kobach to influence states like Arizona and localities like
Hazelton, Pennsylvania, with legal counsel and model restrictive
legislation. 251
Arizona’s Proposition 2000, the “Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act,” was one of the first anti-immigrant laws passed in
2004, kick-starting the restrictive wave of policies. 252 FAIR had
funded the signature-gathering campaign and then pushed the courts
in the state to enforce the law broadly. 253 The law changed voter
registration in the state by requiring residents to prove U.S.
citizenship prior to registering to vote and banned undocumented
immigrants from access to public benefits by requiring state and local
agencies to use strict identification standards that checked for legal
immigration status. 254 It also mandated that state and local officials
report violations of federal immigration law, and made it a
misdemeanor to not follow state law in reporting such violations. 255
State laws grew exponentially, from fifteen in 2005, to forty-nine in
2006, and ninety-eight in 2007 — most of which were restrictive in
nature and modelled after one another. 256

1. Immigrant Rights Origin of Sanctuary Policy
The year 2005 marks a critical moment not just for the decline of
the Second Sanctuary Period’s policy development, when certain
provisions of the Patriot Act reached their sunset, but also for the
immigrant rights movement. The Border Protection, Antiterrorism,
and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437), also called
the Sensenbrenner bill, was a harsh federal law that sought to
criminalize both unlawful presence in the country and associating

250. Id. at 103.
251. Id.
252. See Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 46-140.01
(through 2nd Reg Sess. 50th Leg. 2012) (verifying applicants for public benefits),
https://www.azleg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=https://www.azleg.gov/ars/46/0014001.htm [https://perma.cc/L64R-33G9].
253. GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 111.
254. This provision was held unconstitutional. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council
of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013).
255. GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 60.
256. Id. at 114.
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with any person inside the country who was unauthorized. 257 Section
202 of H.R. 4437 imposed criminal penalties on anyone who “assists,
encourages, directs, or induces a person to reside in or remain in the
United States . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that
such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to reside in or
remain in the United States.” 258 Under this section of the law, “an
American citizen child living with undocumented parents” would be
subject to criminal penalties for “assisting” their parents to “reside in
or remain in the United States.” 259 Criminalizing U.S. children for
being born and living with their immigrant parents escalated the
immigration debate and immigrant rights movement. H.R. 4437
passed the House but was defeated in the Senate. 260 The extreme
nature of the immigration debate in 2005 and harsh measures in the
proposed bill led to deep fissures across party and demographic lines,
and sparked the immigrant rights movement. 261
Immediately following the failed attempt by Republicans to push
through H.R. 4437, coordinated mobilizations occurred across the
country, with an estimated 5 million people marching in over 300
demonstrations in 2006 alone. 262 Immigrants and their allies used
these demonstrations to place pressure on Washington, D.C. to move
towards a bipartisan reform to immigration law that would provide
undocumented immigrants a pathway to citizenship. 263 In May 2006,
the U.S. Senate proposed S. 2611 which included a pathway to
citizenship, as the alternative to H.R. 4437 that sought to criminalize
U.S.-born children. 264 A standstill over the pathway to citizenship

257. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.congress.gov/bill/109thcongress/house-bill/04437 [https://perma.cc/6C5J-EGTB].
258. TOM K. WONG, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION: PARTISANSHIP,
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 8 (2016) [hereinafter
WONG, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION].
259. Id.
260. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.congress.gov/bill/109thcongress/house-bill/04437 [https://perma.cc/6C5J-EGTB].
261. Id. at 7–16.
262. Irene Bloemraad et al., The Protests of 2006: What Were They, How Do We
Understand Them, Where Do We Go?, in RALLYING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: THE
FIGHT FOR INCLUSION IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA 3, 3–7 (Kim Voss & Irene
Bloemraad ed., 2011).
263. See WONG, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION, supra note 258, at 7–16.
264. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.congress.gov/bill/109thcongress/house-bill/04437
[https://perma.cc/6C5J-EGTB];
Comprehensive
109th
Cong.
(2006),
Immigration
Reform
Act,
S.
2611,
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between the Senate and House bills prevented comprehensive
immigration reform from succeeding.
Immigration federalism
scholars explain that, while 2005 had mobilized demonstrations on a
national scale, the immigrant rights movement and funders were
largely focused on reforming federal law. 265
The spread of sanctuary policies focusing on immigration law were
directly connected to the debate happening in Washington, D.C. at
the time. These policies were mostly symbolic declarations of support
to immigrants and a strong signal to national officials of cities’
positions on federal reforms. This first peak in policies was far
smaller than what emerged after 2013, with immigration reform
failures under President Obama, and was more symbolic in nature.
Los Angeles, California, was the first city to pass a sanctuary policy in
2006, which was a symbolic policy to show the city’s opposition to
H.R. 4437 in the U.S. Senate, stating:
WHEREAS, H.R. 4437 could have a potential discriminatory
impact because it would establish a mandatory eligibility verification
system, expanding the voluntary “Basic Pilot” program that is
currently available nationwide which would require a mandatory
verification system to check a job applicants’ immigration status.
This will dramatically impact documented and undocumented
workers and U.S. citizens alike, which could consequently disrupt
the economy. 266

Los Angeles’s 2006 resolution did not change the city policy, but
merely served to voice its opposition to the harsh federal bill up for
consideration in U.S. Congress.
It had already limited its
enforcement of federal immigration law through the police
department’s Special Order 40 in 1979 and the city’s sanctuary policy
in 1985. 267
Over the next two months, four cities passed similar resolutions to
oppose H.R. 4437. 268 On March 8, 2006, Boston passed a resolution
https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/2611 [https://perma.cc/F3TS4FCF].
265. Allan Colbern & Karthick Ramakrishnan, State Policies on Immigrant
Integration: An Examination of Best Practices and Policy Diffusion (U.C. Riverside
School
of
Public
Policy
Working
Paper
Series,
Feb.
2016)
https://www.immigrationresearch-info.org/system/files/state-best-practicesreport_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7AX-EJWD]
[hereinafter
Colbern
&
Ramakrishnan, State Policies].
266. See Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” Appendix, supra note 177. See
Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
267. L.A. Police Dep’t, Cal., Special Ord. No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979).
268. The following city policies directly reference their opposition to H.R. 4437:
Res. 33-06 (S.F. Bd. of Supervisors, Cal. 2006); Res. 74723 (Grand Rapids City
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that made its support for reform that would benefit undocumented
immigrants very clear, declaring “its strong support for
comprehensive immigration reform that combines a path to
permanent status for immigrants already here and wider legal
channels for those coming in the future with humane and effective
enforcement at our borders.” 269 Soon after, San Francisco enacted a
resolution in support of the “Secure America and Orderly
Immigration Act” (S. 1033 and H.R. 2330), which were bipartisan
bills by Senator John McCain and Senator Edward Kennedy that
provided a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. 270

On March 1, 2007, San Francisco became one of the first cities after
2005 to legally resist entangling local law enforcement with
immigration law. 271 The Office of the Mayor issued an executive
order that reaffirmed its 1980s status as a sanctuary city, stating: “No
department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the City and
County of San Francisco may assist Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) investigation, detention or arrest proceedings,”
Comm’n, Mo. 2006); Res. 342-06 (Council of the City of Cleveland, Ohio 2006); see
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” Appendix, supra note 177. See Colbern, Sanctuary
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
269. LAWS, RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES, supra note 92; Colbern, Sanctuary Policy
Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
270. Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/1033/all-info
[https://perma.cc/NUU4-J43Y]; Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, H.R.
2330, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/housebill/2330 [https://perma.cc/VWP6-CAMY].
271. Exec. Directive 07-01 (City & Cty. S.F., Mar. 1, 2007); Colbern, Sanctuary
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
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nor “require information about or disseminate information regarding
the immigration status of an individual when providing services or
benefits.” 272 A few policies mirroring San Francisco spread across the
country from 2007 to 2011, after which a new focus on resisting
immigration detainer requests began to define the sanctuary
movement. 273
In 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a new
collaborative information program, Secure Communities (S-Comm),
that effectively co-opted local law enforcement and jails into
automatically providing the federal government information on all
arrested individuals. 274 The program was slowly rolled out over six
years on a county-by-county basis, dramatically increasing in 2012 and
completed nationwide in 2013. 275 When S-Comm first began to
spread across the country, the National Day Laborer Organizing
Network (NDLON) led the growing immigrant rights movement in
Sanctuary policies
how to resist through model-legislation. 276
emerged that prevented local law enforcement from entering into
287(g) agreements or honoring ICE detainer requests. 277 These
sanctuary policies were very effective in constraining local law
enforcement from honoring ICE detainer requests and decreasing
deportations. 278
Madison, Wisconsin passed a policy on June 1, 2010 that continued
to urge the city’s police department to “continue its current practice
of not entering into Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) agreement with ICE” and asked the:
County Sheriff’s Office to end its current practice of contacting ICE
at booking time for all cases involving processing of non-US citizen
jail inmates and instead more narrowly tailor its policy by contacting

272. Exec. Directive 07-01 (City & Cty. S.F., Mar. 1, 2007).
273. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
274. See Secure Communities: Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities [https://perma.cc/6VYUM47W].
275. See Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement
Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J. L. & ECON. 937, 948
(2014).
276. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 129.
277. Res. 10-00530 (Common Council of the City of Madison, Wis. 2010); Colbern,
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
278. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 130.
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ICE only for non-US citizen inmates who are being held on a
possible felony charge. 279

Aided by NDLON, Santa Clara County, California, passed a
resolution in 2010 preventing local officials and resources from
investigating, questioning, apprehending, or arresting any person for
immigration purposes. 280 The following year, it enacted a much more
specific policy limiting local law enforcement from honoring ICE
detainer requests. 281 Over the next few years, anti-detainer sanctuary
policies began to spread across cities and counties, and local law
enforcement agencies began to issue similar sanctuary policies as
public statements or official department policies.
A robust state and local pro-immigrant policy movement was
underway by 2010 and 2011, fueled by the failure of the federal
DREAM Act in 2010. 282 California in particular was the frontrunner, passing laws to grant financial aid to undocumented workers
in 2001, 283 limiting the use of the federal E-Verify in 2011, 284 granting
driver’s licenses for DACA recipients in 2012 and for undocumented
residents in 2013, 285 and passing a range of other integration and
sanctuary measures. 286 In 2013, California passed the Transparency

279. Res. 10-00530 (Common Council of the City of Madison, Wis. 2010); Colbern,
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
280. Res. No. 2010-316 (Santa Clara Bd. of Supervisors, Cal. 2010); Colbern,
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
281. Res. No. 2011-504 (Santa Clara County, Cal. Oct. 18, 2011); Colbern,
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
282. Ramakrishnan & Colbern, The California Package, supra note 117, at 9–10;
GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 120.
283. A.B.
540, 2001-02
Gen
Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Cal.
2001),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200120020AB540
[https://perma.cc/BGT4-RPX8].
284. A.B. 1236, 2011-12 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (added Article 2.5
(commencing with Section 2811) to Chapter 2 of Division 3 of the Labor Code),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_12011250/ab_1236_bill_20110331_amended_asm_v98.pdf [https://perma.cc/644R-VCTY].
285. See Ramakrishnan & Colbern, The California Package, supra note 117, at 3–4;
Laura E. Enriquez et al., Driver’s Licenses for All? Racialized Illegality and the
Implementation of Progressive Immigration Policy in California, 41 L. & POL. 34
(2019).
286. See generally COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 112–96 (analyzing
California’s evolution from regressive to progressive state citizenship); Colbern &
Ramakrishnan, supra note 88 (analyzing California’s policies and historical shift on
immigrant rights and advancing a theory of how California’s progressive state
citizenship crystallized in 2014); Colbern & Ramakrishnan, State Policies, supra note
265 (providing an overview of various state-level policies that aim towards
integration, and arguing that California has led the way in passing the most farreaching laws intended to assist with immigration integration); Ramakrishnan &
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and Responsibility Using State Tools (TRUST) Act, providing that
officers can only enforce immigration detainers issued by ICE for
persons convicted of serious crimes. 287 In 2014, when California’s
TRUST Act went into effect, the city of San Francisco and counties of
Contra Costa, Alameda, and San Mateo announced that they would
no longer cooperate with any ICE detention requests of possible
unauthorized immigrants in local jails. 288 California’s state and local
sanctuary policies resulted in a major decrease in deportations by ICE
after 2014 and caused President Obama, under the direction of
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, to end S-Comm that same
year. 289 Democratic control of the state, and partnerships between
officials and immigrant rights organizations, have paved the road for
California to expand its sanctuary-type protections exponentially
since 2014, including passing the TRUTH Act in 2016 and Values Act
in 2017. 290

2. Sanctuary as More than Resistance-Only
Immigration federalism had a profound impact on where sanctuary
policies were emerging. California cities were responsible for the
enactment of 33% of the 108 sanctuary policies from 2014 to 2018. 291
California police and sheriff’s departments were responsible for 27%
of the 147 sanctuary policies enacted during this same period. 292 In
both cases, city government and local law enforcement policies built

Colbern, The California Package, supra note 117 (analyzing the “California package”
of immigrant integration policies).
287. The Trust Act of 2013, A.B. 4, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2013).
288. See San Francisco Joins Neighboring Counties in Suspending Undocumented
Immigrant
Jail
Holds,
CBS
SAN
FRANCISCO
(May
29,
2014),
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/05/29/san-francisco-joins-neighboring-countiesin-suspending-undocumented-immigrant-jail-holds/ [https://perma.cc/249B-LCQ9].
289. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 130.
290. California lowered state crimes and convictions to prevent immigration
implications from happening (AB 813 and SB 1242 passed in 2016; SB 180 passed in
2017), banned new immigrant detention center contracts from being made with the
federal government (passed in the 2017 budget), protected immigrant workers from
preventable worksite raids (AB 450 passed in 2017), provided due process rights to
detained immigrants by requiring ethical representation and confidentiality from
attorneys (passing AB 60 in 2015), provided financial assistance to aid immigrants in
obtaining legal counsel (passing AB 1476 in 2014, and passing SB 78 in 2015), and
established a Deportation Defense Services Fund of $15 million in 2017. See also
Colbern & Ramakrishnan, supra note 88, at 14.
291. California Cities were responsible for 36 out of the 108 policies from 2014 to
2018. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
292. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
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on and cited California’s state laws, often passing new laws in order to
align local policy with state policy. Our dataset shows similar patterns
in the sanctuary policies of other states and localities as well. For
example, local government and law enforcement policies spread after
Connecticut’s TRUST Act passed in 2013, 293 after Illinois’s TRUST
Act passed in 2017, 294 after Oregon’s sanctuary policy passed in
2017, 295 and after New Jersey’s Governor issued his executive order
in 2018 reversing the state’s stance to “pro-sanctuary.” 296
Understanding state-level patterns in enacting sanctuary policies is
critical for understanding the nature of resistance through sanctuary
policies in the Trump era, as policy expansions emerged in 2017
mostly in states like California, Massachusetts, and Illinois. 297 While
Trump-era politics may have fueled new states and cities to enact
sanctuary policies for the first time, a pro-immigrant policy movement
at the state and local level had laid the constitutional groundwork for
sanctuary policies. Post-2017 sanctuary policies were part of a twodecade movement to reform federal law to provide a pathway to
citizenship for all undocumented immigrants. Within this movement,
sanctuary policies developed in direct response to harsh federal bills
that denied this pathway, as well as harsh immigration enforcement
through S-Comm from 2008 to 2014. By the time President Trump
took office in 2017, immigrant rights organizations in progressive
states had issued blueprints outlining their policy successes on
immigrant rights and protections that could be used by jurisdictions
beginning to build a more welcoming state or city for immigrants. 298

293. H.B.
6659, 2013
Gen
Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Conn. 2013),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/2013PA-00155-R00HB-06659-PA.htm
[https://perma.cc/328V-KZQX].
294. S.B.
0031,
100th
Gen.
Assemb.
(Ill.
2017),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=31&GAID=14&GA=100&D
ocTypeID=SB&LegID=98874&SessionID=91 [https://perma.cc/3TV2-HBFT].
295. H. B. 3464, 79th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017),
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB3464/Enrolle
d. [https://perma.cc/45L4-UH8Z]
296. Office of the N.J. Attorney General, Attorney General Law Enforcement
Directive No. 2018-6 (2018), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/agdirective-2018-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/55JJ-7KUB].
297. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author).
298. See generally Colbern & Ramakrishnan, State Policies, supra note 265
(discussing the research and policy advocacy of immigration policy advocacy
organizations); GABRIELA VILLAREAL, THE CALIFORNIA BLUEPRINT: TWO DECADES
OF
PRO-IMMIGRANT
TRANSFORMATION
(2015),
https://ncg.org/sites/default/files/resources/The-California-Blueprint-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9W8-AJFG]; NEW YORK IMMIGRATION COALITION, BLUEPRINT
FOR IMMIGRANT NEW YORK (2017), https://d1jiktx90t87hr.cloudfront.net/323/wp-
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This history reveals that sanctuary policies crafted from immigrant
rights movements were far more than a resistance to President
Trump.
III. A HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SANCTUARY
POLICIES
Reconsidering sanctuary policies as three distinctive periods of
development provides legal, empirical, and theoretical advantages.
Our periodization scheme contributes a more nuanced set of cases for
analyzing causal relations between sanctuary and crime. The holistic
framework reconciles the intricacies of social movements with legal
movements, by analyzing them through distinct periods in the
evolution of sanctuary policy.
Diverse areas of scholarship have treated sanctuary policies as a
single development that originated in 1980 and continues to evolve
today. Yet, federal laws over the past four decades have changed
dramatically, thereby shaping the ways in which sanctuary policies are
constructed. Immigrant rights movements have also evolved and restructured sanctuary policies to better resist the federal government
and uphold constitutional rights. Indeed, a range of sanctuary
policies are now emerging from states, counties, cities, local law
enforcement agencies, churches, and colleges, as a reaction to the
federal push for local immigration enforcement and to the
increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the federal
government.
This Article provides an important synthesis of typological-legal,
historical-legal, historical-moral, and policy-data approaches to
studying sanctuary, to show that sanctuary is much more than a
resistance movement. Importantly, it establishes a framework that
identifies three sanctuary periods, which track federal and sanctuary
laws through three significant moments in U.S. history. It also
consolidates the creation of immigrant-rights and church-based
movements. Importantly, this Article recognizes an important truth:
Social movements underpin the specific legal and constitutional
principles that make sanctuary policies a cornerstone for immigrants’
rights.

content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/nyic_Blueprint_for_ImmigrantNY_v5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z89D-D5LM].
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CONCLUSION
After the President’s anti-sanctuary executive order was issued in
January 2017, Santa Clara filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
arguing that “the Executive Order has created a cloud of financial
uncertainty so overwhelming that it irreparably harms the Country’s
ability to budget, govern and ultimately provide services to the
residents it serves.” 299 Santa Clara was not alone. Four other cities
filed lawsuits challenging the executive order. 300 On April 25, 2017, a
federal judge joined the Santa Clara and San Francisco motions,
ruling that the executive order likely violated the Spending Clause by
removing federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions and ordered a
nation-wide preliminary injunction. 301 On August 1, 2018, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in City and County of
San Francisco v. Trump, lifted the nation-wide injunction and allowed
President Trump’s anti-sanctuary order to go into effect. 302
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit preserved the injunction on the
executive order for California, because the court considered there
was sufficient evidence of federal intent to injure the state and its
localities. 303 According to the Ninth Circuit, “the district court noted
that California and its cities, especially San Francisco, were visible
targets of the Administration’s intent to defund sanctuary
jurisdictions.” 304 It then found that there was not sufficient evidence
that other states and localities would be similarly targeted and injured
in order for a nation-wide injunction to be justified. 305 Despite the
federalism conflicts they raise, sanctuary policies stand on deep
constitutional grounds, which is why California remains shielded from

299. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23–24, County of Santa Clara, No.
17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal Feb. 3, 2017); see also Lai & Lasch, supra note 1.
300. See generally Complaint, City & County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump,
275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00485); Complaint,
County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2017) (No. 5:17-cv-00574); Complaint, City of Chelsea & City of Lawrence v. Donald
J. Trump (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv- 10214); Complaint, City of Richmond
v. Donald J. Trump, 2017 WL 6945397 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01535);
Complaint, City of Seattle v. Donald J. Trump, 2017 WL 4700144 (W.D. Wash. Mar.
29, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00497).
301. See County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal
2017) (order granting the County of Santa Clara’s and City and County of San
Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin Section 9(a) of Exec. Order 13768).
302. See City & County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231
(9th Cir. 2018).
303. See id. at 1344–45.
304. Id. at 1238.
305. See id. at 1244.
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the executive order. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit ruling, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
denied a motion to strike down California’s TRUST Act, stating that
the state sanctuary law was not an “obstacle” to federal
enforcement. 306 California’s former State Senator and leader on
immigrant rights, Kevin de León, responded to the ruling to uphold
sanctuary, stating: “California is under no obligation to assist Trump
tear families apart.” 307 Current litigation has upheld sanctuary
policies’ constitutional legitimacy.
As this Article shows, President Trump’s narrative that sanctuary
policies violate federal law and challenge core American values
ignores their critical place in American history. Sanctuary policies
became less connected to the specific struggles of Central American
refugees and assumed broader goals related to civil rights and
immigrant rights that span the basic functions of state and local
governance. Sanctuary today provides a moral and constitutionally
legitimate form of integration and protection with regard to
undocumented residents.

306. United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2018).
307. Thomas Fuller, Judge Rules for California over Trump in Sanctuary Law
Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/californiasanctuary-law-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/B67R-LGPM].

